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________________________________________________________________________________ 
Parliamentary politics is governed by a set of rules which steer conduct. How rigid is this conduct 
in unusual circumstances? 
When The Finns Party split in the middle of the parliamentary year of 2017, half of the party 
representatives was lost by a Government party to the Opposition. This thesis is a case study of 
how the elected representatives acted out their policies in plenary sessions after the parliamentary 
base was dramatically altered. The voting results are studied by utilizing a commonly used index 
tool in order to make the changes in voting preferences intelligible. A simple linear regression 
model reveals the differences of parties regarding policy preferences. The data of the plenary 
sessions from 2017 is courtesy of Antti Pajala from the University of Turku. The archive of 
plenary sessions in the Finnish Parliament Eduskunta are public data and available in the 
eduskunta.fi website. 
The issues voted upon in plenary sessions are generally drafted by the Government coalition. 
Therefore the Opposition is primarily the underdog as a mover in policy space. It tends to corrects 
its position depending on the bills Government presents. 
A single large party splits, and the split sides, entrenched against one another, do not display 
similarities in the formerly united party groups. The formerly unified party groups fulfill their role 
in both Government and Opposition side respectably, but only to an extent. 
The Blue Reform acts out the role of a pivotal Government ally. The Finns Party on the other 
hand, after siding with the Opposition, doesn’t enlarge its unity. Its role as a member of the 
coalition only partly explains the actions the Opposition ensues in plenary votes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the report on social climate by Koivisto(2017), the views of Finnish legislators and 
the Finnish commerce professionals are at odds. This cleavage concerns the predictability of 
current political affairs in Finland. The reasons why top ranking industry officials haven’ currently 
been too optimistic, lie in the distrust in development of streamlining legislature in order to 
increase investment in Finland. The Sipilä cabinet, the 74th government of Finland,  had been in 
power for two years in June 2017. The cabinet was originally formed by the Centre Party(KESK), 
National Coalition(KOK) and The Finns Party(PS). The selection of a new chairman in The Finns 
Party convention, resulted in its coalition partners to declare distrust in the possibility of 
continuing in the same cabinet coalition. The reasons for this where said to be differences in world 
view. Before PM Sipilä was able to declare his cabinet to be defunct and new parliamentary 
election to be called, the Finns Party cabinet ministers informed that they had quit The Finns Party 
and where eager to continue working in the same cabinet with PM Sipilä. This was a dramatic 
twist in Finnish politics and took a heavy toll on Finns Party (in terms of the amount of MPs), 
whose rise from a marginalized group to a prominent cabinet member party within a decade, now 
saw half of its parliamentary seats(including their cabinet ministers) taken from them in just one 
sudden event. This change in the parliamentary base made the government and opposition sides 
more even, at least if measured by head count. One wonders how could this sort of a blow to a 
parliamentary party affect its political work. 
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2. AIMS OF THIS STUDY 
The Elected Members of Parliament do not always vote according to their party line. They also do 
not always vote exactly for the line their constituencies are predicting. The complete unity in 
voting in the parliamentary plenary sessions is called total cohesion. This has been the theme of 
several academic publications across decades, Rice(1925), Lijphart(1963), Poole & 
Rosenthal(1985), Hug(2005), Pajala(2013) among others. They have aimed at understanding why 
would representative Members of Parliament(MPs) deviate from the stance of their parliamentary 
party group(PPG). When looking at issues being voted upon, it is also possible to point at what is 
the standing of the legislators in regards to their preferences and ideology. The expected 
probability of deviant action inside voting blocs is one of the most influential aspects of cohesion 
studies. This way the representativeness of political parties can also be assessed against the 
policies of their respected parties proper(Hix & Noury, 2016). The event of a comparatively large 
party splitting into two rivaling factions in parliament, which serves as the premise for this study, 
makes one wonder of the effect on voting cohesion between respected party groups within a 
common coalition, as well as between rivaling coalitions that encompass several parliamentary 
party groups. The subject of this study is the plenary votes during the parliamentary year 2017 of 
the Finnish Parliament ´Eduskunta´. 
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3. BACKGROUND ON VOTING 
COHESION STUDIES 
3.1. An account on notable abbreviations 
It is not only conversation on political parties that use various abbreviations, but there are also 
organizations and concepts that are more commonly known by their abbreviation form than a 
bulgy long form. For the sake of consistency, the original Finnish language abbreviation of the 
Finnish political parties is used, as in the data of voting activity inside the Finnish parliament 
Eduskunta during 2017. 
EPG(s) - European Parliamentary Group(s) 
EP - European Parliament 
KD - Christian Democrats(Fin. Kristillisdemokraatit) 
KESK - Centre Party of Finland(Fin. Suomen Keskusta) 
KOK - National Coalition Party(Fin. Kansallinen Kokoomus) 
MEP(s) - Member(s) of European Parliament 
MP(s) - Member(s) of Parliament 
PPG - Parliamentary Party Group 
PS - The Finns Party(Fin. Perussuomalaiset) 
RKP - Swedish People´s Party of Finland(Fin. Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue) 
SDP - Social Democratic Party of Finland(Fin. Suomen sosiaalidemokraattinen puolue) 
SIN - Blue Reform(Fin. Sininen Tulevaisuus) 
UNGA - United Nations General Assembly 
VAS - Left Alliance(Fin. Vasemmistoliitto) 
VIHR - Greens(Fin. Vihreät) 
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3.2. Stuart Rice and Simon Hix 
The Rice Index has for decades been a universally used measure to Quantitative measures in the 
study of politics. Stuart Rice himself talked about the problematics of political 
representativeness(1938). He was a staunch advocate of using commonplace data to be used in 
tapping to the will of the public. The index that bears his name is a simple one, and has been used 
in several publications to reveal the amount of cohesion policy makers have inclusively within 
their associated group and also in exclusive circumstances. This sort of quantitative tool can help 
to understand the polarity of groups. Rice(1925) describes the index measurement tool from the 
perspective of the United States Congress as Democrats voting alongside and against the 
Republicans. For the reader that points to the fact that the American system is dominated by two 
rivaling factions, it needs to be pointed out that yes, this is correct, but in the democratic process, 
the possibility that groups outside the realm of two can exist, even in the United States context. 
The study of voting cohesion has gone a long way, and that in the European context, the data of the 
studies regarding multiparty systems is well established. Additionally, in this study as well as in 
many others, the members of a given parliament are divided into natural subgroups in order to 
understand the possible breaks in cohesion to imply the emergence of voting blocs according to 
their proximal affiliation. 
Votes do ´swing´ and quantifiable measurement casts light on to the actions of the voter in a way 
that was formerly looked at, according to Rice, in an un-neglectful fashion. With this sort of tool 
that Rice insisted to be used, full unity, or total cohesion, =”1” and total non-unity, meaning that 
the votes are distributed fifty-fifty among both arguments of the issue, as nil. This is the unity 
within a voting set, such as the entire parliament, or just a single party group. Formal notation of 
the votes cast inside parliament, according to Rice, is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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 (Figure 1. The representation of the voting cohesion measurement model by Rice) 
As Hug(2005) points out, the United States roll-call votes are something that have been studied by 
academics for long time due to their public availability. Taking the vote by roll call means that the 
representatives give their vote by vocally expressing it, as their name is called one by one.  Hug’s 
study made the comparison between the United States Congress, The European Parliament and the 
Swiss lower house in order to specify the differences on the publicity of votes. For instance, if only 
a subset or final votes of a given parliament are made public, it is possible that the discourse 
between legislators is not being revealed in a transparent manner. This is important, as the 
parliaments in different countries do not necessarily yield their voting results to the public and, it 
can be argued, result in decrease in the probability of MPs voting in an assumed manner. 
In cases where Members of The House of Representatives or other similar legislators vote on 
issues, there is the possibility for the decision to abstain from a given vote, whether it is for 
strategic or other reasons. The study on United States Congress roll-call votes conducted by Poole 
& Rosenthal(1985), used a computer program to quantifiably describe the preference movement of 
legislators and the deviance thereof. In its essence, the study was influential in examining 
legislator voting activity. This has pressured academics to tweak the fundamental idea of Rice’s 
agreeability Index in ways that are exemplified by studies such as the one of Hix, Noury & 
Roland(2018). Their enhanced cohesion measurement makes the natural options of MPs more 
distinct, so that the nil, or non-cohesiveness that Rice talked about, is emerged from legislators not 
voting in unison when there are three possible voting options. That is, voting option ”YES” is 
preferred by 1/3 of voters, as well as the two other options(”NO” and ”ABSTAIN”), such that 
Cohesion=0. 
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 (Figure 2. The representation of the voting cohesion measurement model by Hix) 
We can look at mathematical formulation depicting how to illustrate cohesion, but there is one 
thing that we should understand first and foremost: If we think about a group of people that are 
aimed to make a collective decision, it is beneficial to find the right size group depending on the 
issue being decided upon. For the sake of illustrating voting cohesion, the short article by Sheila 
Margolis(2011), hints that even a group of seven might bee too big for optimal decision making. 
This is on the lines of several business managers’ nuggets on how big a decision making group 
should perhaps be. The pizza-rule by Bezos(Choi, 2018) is tangent to all sorts of self-help, but we 
indulge them to make sense of group cohesion. What this means is that a group that is affective in 
decision making should perhaps, according to this example at least, not be larger than a group that 
can consume two pizzas. Let’s then suppose, for argument’s sake, that a group of six people is of 
proper size for optimal decision making. When six individuals are torn between two possible 
outcomes, three of them votes for option A and the other three votes for option B, he result for this 
is that the group is stuck in their polarization. There is no winner. That is what zero(´0´) means 
when talking about cohesion in regards to plenary voting. 
Let us then think about another situation, where two possible options are still available, but a third 
possible option, C, is additionally presented. Suppose the same six people that were previously 
divided by the two options are now similarly divided by three options. Two of them vote for A, 
another two for B, and the third pair votes for C. Yet again the situation is that there are no 
winners. The cohesion is ´0´, but we cannot utilize the Rice index, as it doesn’t take into account a 
third option. This is why the Hix Index is useful for detecting the ´no win situation´ as zero ´0´, but 
still yields similar cohesion values overall as the Rice Index does. 
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The inherent problem of understanding voting cohesion in certain parliaments is that, unlike the 
United States, the votes are not been made available, or a roll call vote is requested as a strategic 
measure. What this means is that in certain situations, the representatives are able to vote on some 
issues in secret, so that their personal opinion is not revealed to their own party comrades, other 
party representatives, or respected constituencies. The strategic possibilities of certain votes might 
imply that the cohesion values published might be skewed to be too high of low, indicating 
selection bias, when voting activity is scrutinized. 
After the final legislative issues of the seventh European Parliament(EP7) became to be decided by 
roll call votes, the study of the voting cohesion within the European Parliament could be assessed 
in the light by comparing the era before and after the voting procedure change. During one era the 
roll call votes for final issues where not mandatory, during another era the final issue rolla call 
votes where mandatory. Therefore Hix, Noury & Roland(2018) had the control and treatment they 
needed in order to examine whether there was a substantial difference in in the voting patterns of 
the Members of European Parliament(MEPs) before and after the final legislative roll call vote 
procedure had taken effect. No major differences where found with the mandatory and requested 
roll call vote cohesion, but this leaves the question whether cohesion is prone to shift aggressively 
one way or another if some roll-call votes would be secret. 
3.2. Voting in a variety of contexts 
Plenary votes are taken in plenary sessions of a parliament. Plenary sessions are the bread and 
butter of the parliamentary representative’s working days. The modern systems of electrically 
aided voting is something that makes parliamentary roll call voting fast, efficient, and easy to 
document. The technology of the modern plenary or roll call voting had been in existence for a 
long time before its official utilization and the original patent for this influential technology was 
appropriated by none other than Thomas A. Edison(Edison, 1869). A system to aid in roll call 
voting had been proposed since the 19th Century, but had first been met with suspicion and fear 
that it would affect the opinions of legislators and policy overall.  
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The electronic voting system obviously catches on eventually in the The United States House of 
Representatives and has had its latest upgrade was during the tenure of the 105th Congress(Straus, 
2008). In the publication by Cox & McCubbins(1991), the roll call votes within the United States 
House of Representatives were examined to understand the intra party cohesion of the 
representatives, as well as the evolution of deviance in voting within established voting blocs. 
Studies concerning legislative voting in the United States revolves around the frame of the 
dualism, given the American political system is hard wired to  distribute legislative power to two 
powerful political entities. 
The primary motivation in this research, is that the presumption of a political party will vote in 
accordance to their predetermined ideology, can be premature. The study of  congressional voting 
by Jaenicke(2002) examines the positions the Republican and Democrat legislators take in various 
issues. To be more precise, the study looks at the historical development of intra-party cohesion in 
regards to abortion issues. Abortion has polarized legislators since it was first been discussed in the 
United States Congress. The data indicates that during the timespan from mid 1970s up to the 21st 
century, the trend has been towards taking a stance on this issue has moved towards Extremes. 
This means that during the course of time, an increased number of Democrats in the House of 
Representatives have become more interested in voting pro choice, the colloquial for maintaining 
the legal status of abortion. On the other hand, there is also a trend of Republicans voting exactly 
the opposite. However, mixed opinions also reside within these party groups. The extreme 
Christian conservative views(against family planning, abortion)within the Republican Party is a 
relatively new phenomenon in contemporary politics, whereas the attitudes on libertarian fiscal 
policy and hostility towards a welfare state is something that is mostly shared among all 
Republicans. This is just a tangible example of what the decrease of cohesion within a party group 
might mean. 
In order to obtain increased roll call voting openness in the United States, govtrack.us (Tauberer, 
2018) has collected and examined the roll call votes of the United States Congress. Tauberer's 
recent remarks on the value of democratic representation of the Senate, the upper house of 
Congress, has not only been the descriptive of roll call votes passing with smaller margins than 
ever before in the US history, but that the representation of the legislators voting is of 
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constituencies that do not represent the majority of the population. This means that given that 
states have similar representation despite their population size, an unanimous coalition of 
representatives of small states can increase the value of their mutual voting power regardless of 
majority public opinion. Without sounding too obscure, we can look at the much reported 
confirmation case of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, where the comparable representation of states in the 
Senate triggered outrage for the decision deemed undemocratic(Feldman, 2018). The smaller 
states, having the same number of senators as the large ones, seemed to be able to wield voting 
power to shift issues strategically. Without taking sides on the issue, it must be taken to account 
that varying parliamentary systems are the produce of decisions by people, whose views and 
strategic conduct are bound to their respected time. 
When looking at the voting activity of the United Nations General Assembly(UNGA), the way 
representatives group in coalitions and voting blocs is multifaceted, and have natural subgrouping 
due to various national interests being embedded within. The natural sub-groupings, such as a 
group of countries that share similar cultural traits as well as geographical proximity, tend to form 
blocs that tend to vote on similar lines. The investigation by Hosli et al.(2010) used the cohesion 
variance of the European Union(EU) within the UNGA as a case study. The cohesion variance of 
the organization that started of as an alliance of few European nation to boost certain economic 
realms, and eventually building up to become a tightening union of independent(and 
interdependent) nations within a same union, has had the trend of increased uniformity throughout 
time. Whether we see the trend of voting unity of the EU move toward one direction or another , 
the catalyst for the movement seemed to be the gradual expansion of the union’s borders. That is, 
the cultural similarity or difference of a joining state in comparison to the rest of the already-
member-states, impacts the unity of decision making. There was an increase in abstaining votes 
after the European Community first started to take its unionized shape. this trend started to wain 
after the European nations emerged as a somewhat unitary political body with shared interests 
during the gradual self-destruction of the socialist block in eastern Europe by the end of the 20th 
century. 
Because the data by Hosli et al.(2010)is had been collected from a long timeframe, the case study 
looked at internal cohesion through the backdrop and evolution of the transnational political 
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trends. The votes within such a colossal body, the interests of the people involved, vary in 
accordance to shifts in high profile international issues. Across time, the global narrative regarding 
these issues have not necessarily restricted the representatives to use their voice contrary to their 
primary ideological viewpoints. 
The votes in the UNGA are not legally binding within the national level legislative bodies. Voting 
contrary to a state’s national political pragmaticism is not necessarily something that happens 
causally from in regards to a UNGA resolution. It should be considered more of an act as a catalyst 
towards an increased good for all in accordance to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights(UDHR). To put it more bluntly, the countries that have had their track record on human 
rights questioned, might aim at boosting their market value on these issues, in the eyes of the 
international community. -The signaling  increased attention towards human rights violations in 
their jurisdictions. 
The occurrences in UNGA voting activity have been highly influenced by the waining of 
colonialism, as well as the power, or in recent decades the lack of, Soviet influence throughout the 
world. Recently, the growing interest by scholars and policy makers alike to establish the rise of 
China as a global power and map out the shifts in cohesion within UNGA to determine, whether 
Chinese global influence is seen as as asset for regional powers(Brazys, Dukalskis, 2017). In the 
hypothesis it was asked whether countries that are keen to export to China’s large market, would 
gradually start to side with China on weighty global issues during a period of ten years in the 
beginning of the 21st century. The results did suggest that many countries, many with their track 
record on human rights been questioned, had gradually started to side with the normative stances 
China took against major western powers. This could be considered as an advancement of China’s 
movement towards being a legitimate challenger for the global hegemony of the United States 
within the UNGA and beyond. 
The nature of the UNGA, as expressed in the publication by Primiano & Xiang(2016) and 
enforced by Lijphart(1963), is that although acts of voting blocs tend to primarily differentiate 
among geopolitical or ideological factors, they are prone to form smaller or intersectional blocs 
regarding the issue in question. This is view is at least partly strengthened by Lai & Lefler(2016) 
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in their publication examining the regional representation of United Nations member states 
geographical positioning within the United Nations Security Council. Their concluding remarks 
state that polarizing issues such as national or international security can decrease the probability of 
a certain geographic area player to vote in a heuristically predictable way. In other words, the 
countries that usually vote in relative unison with their geographic peers, might tend to slip on 
doing this when the issue is related to their own state’s national security or sovereignty. 
3.3. The systems and the agenda 
The study on the ´unity´ of a voting bloc of legislators in Westminster style parliamentary systems, 
illustrates the strong majority government bloc as a driving force for agenda setting. The 
Westminster style system can be considered the most influential of all parliamentary systems in 
place in modern democracies. The forcefulness of the government in a government-opposition-
voting acts as a catalyst for an opposition to increase cohesion by undermining MPs personal 
preferences. This characteristic is stated as important to note in the comparison between the voting 
cohesion within the bicameral Parliament of the United Kingdom and the unicameral Parliament of 
Scotland(Dewan & Spirling, 2011). Simply put, during roll-call votes on decisive issues in 
Parliament, the influence of the parliamentary system design tends to overshadow the influence of 
agendas themselves. The opposition draws its force from voting as a bloc against the government 
no matter what the issue is. A simulation that draws varying sized blocs from a normal distribution 
indicates that the opposition coalition turns to voting on line with the government coalition as its 
size diminishes. 
The representatives of respected parties within a coalition, be it government or opposition, have 
various preferences towards issues been decided upon. Some of these preferences might carry 
enough weight to supersede either the positive relationship between the legislator and the 
legislator’s own constituency, or expected homogeneity of a PPG as a whole. The legislator’s 
preferences are always torn between the will of the people who voted for him/her, the will of the 
party that supports him/her, and the political rivals which aim to subjugate him/her. To exemplify 
this, the publication of party cohesion in and out of the European Parliament(EP)  by McElroy & 
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Benoit(2012) notes that the ideological positions of party members shift based on whether their 
attendance is national or transnational, much the same way as in the case by Lai & Lefler(2016). In 
addition to this, the size and track record of a PPG or a coalition constructed of several PPGs, can 
affect their expected probability of successfully affecting legislation(Laver, Schofield, 1998, p. 
149). With at least all this taken into account, it can be considered superficial to try to understand 
parliamentary parties’ legislative actions only with ´moving one way or the other´(such as 
socioeconomic left or right). The vote swing might be much more subtle. By looking at various 
European parliamentary systems, there is a wide array of differences in coalition sizes and the 
longevity of cabinets. The heterogeneity of parliamentary systems makes the prediction of voting 
difficult, as in many instances larger party systems decreased the cabinet life expectancy, and still 
this is not the truth in every single case. 
In the European Parliament(EP), not all issues in are decided by vote, but as a roll call vote can be 
requested by e.g. opposition group member, it can be used to measure the unity for the voting 
blocs themselves. The way that a possible penalty procedures might be inflicted by the group 
leaders towards group members for inadequate cohesion, can be illustrated as a game theoretical 
model, aimed at predetermining voters actions. The position taken by Carubba, Gabel & 
Hug(2008) about the measurement of voting cohesion, being that roll call votes ´should´ give a 
good view of political decision making, is that legislators are representative of their constituencies. 
However, The strategic preferences of voting makes the study of this activity fairly difficult, as 
finding a proper random sample of votes and trying to determine how sincere the legislators are, is 
overshadowed by the strategic nature of roll-call voting. If certain strategically important votes are 
not available for studies, the measurement for cohesion can be questioned. 
The game theoretic model where the party leader uses best judgement, given that the ideal points 
of two opposing forces(i, j) reside in the opposite ends of a one dimensional policy space. The 
game commences with one, both or either of the opponent leaders requesting for a roll-call vote 
based on their best guess of an outcome. Whether the vote is secret or not, depends on who 
requests. In this case the vote is secret when no leader requests it. By using sub-game perfection to 
flesh out equilibrium rates. This is intended to draw a wide range of observations that could be 
utilized to understand the quality of a sample when studying the unity of voting blocs. 
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The leaders of legislative voting blocs that know the possibilities and constraints of how roll call 
voting, can affect overall discipline. In the Carrubba, Gabel & Hug paper(2008), asking for a roll 
call vote acted as the sequential ”function of disciplining efforts”, it could be that the efforts of 
bloc leaders might, with their own action, make voting unity seem stronger than it actually is. The 
model sequence is that there is a proposal for which the parties either do or do not request a roll-
call vote on. If there is a vote, the party leaders set a level of discipline for deviation. 
In the publication by Mühlböck & Yordanova(2012), the selection of roll call votes for study 
purposes comes with an expected bias due to the the fact that roll call votes might act as a strategic 
measure for voting blocs to achieve increased cohesion. The best way to get a glimpse of cohesion 
in roll-call votes is to compare situations where the process of roll call votes is automated and 
compare it to when it is not. This had been made possible with the case of the European 
Parliaments legislative issues, a final legislative decisions are called as roll call votes every time by 
automation after 2009(European Parliament, Rules of procedure, 2010). Interestingly enough, the 
voting cohesion in the European Parliament seems to have increased after roll call votes had been 
automated, which adds to the narrative that not only are the legislators necessarily not just pawns 
for pre whipped agendas, but that the understanding of cohesion in various domains can seem 
slippery to attain. 
The PPG leaders’ ambitions to curb heterogeneity within a voting bloc(´whipping´) is outlined in 
the publication by Bailer(2018), which scrutinizes these practices across five European 
parliaments, encompassing seventy-six PPGs. Overall it is the larger and established parties that 
tend to be pressured to guide their flock in a certain direction in voting. In smaller groups this is 
not unprecedented, but voting tends to be more relaxed, and members votes represent their 
conscience. The ways of which MPs are penalized for deviating from their common group view 
can be anything from depriving of possibility to travel to not been given media coverage. 
Interestingly, dissenting members might also be penalized by giving them privileges or access to 
delegations, so that the person in question could be steered away from e.g. a committee 
assignment. The data that had been collected regarding these issues was the comparison between 
specialist in and group leader interviews. The results stem from interview data. 
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The House of Lords is the upper house of the British Parliament. It is not democratically elected, 
but appointed by the monarch with the advice of the Prime Minister of the day and of the House of 
Lords Appointment Commission. Some of the seats of the Lords is acquired by inheritance. The 
role of the House of Lords(parliament.uk) is to check the bills for which the lower House of 
Commons has decided upon, but do not necessarily alter their decisions, but act more as an 
advisory body. The majority of the seats corresponds to the political affiliations of the House of 
Commons, although the House of Lords is numerically superior to the lower house. The research 
done of the voting cohesion of the British House of Lords by Russell(2012) implies that punishing 
and rewarding isn’t necessarily what yields the increase in cohesion. The premise for the study, 
which was conducted from a Social Psychology perspective, doesn’t find the deviators from 
cohesion to have any sort of common nominator. This is due to the scarcity of lords voting against 
their bloc and thus the phenomenon of ´voting deviance´ being random in nature. The overall 
cohesion of voting in the chamber tends to be very high indeed. However there is little of no acts 
of whipping concerned. It therefore presumed that high cohesion can perhaps also be attained by 
common sense of duty and that certain plenary measures aiming to steer legislative voting might in 
some circumstances be excessive and counterproductive. 
In ´Multiparty Government´ by Laver & Schofield(1998, p. 24), the northern European intra party 
cohesion is coined having ´Scandinavian iron discipline´. This means that although Western 
European democracies tend to act with a high unanimity, in the case of the Northern European 
countries this is even more so. In the case of Iceland(Kristinsson, 2011), the overall cohesion in the 
plenary voting of the Icelandic Parliament(Althingi) is very high. 
The publication by Pajala(2013) regarding voting cohesion in the Finnish Parliament ´Eduskunta´ 
since the the end of the Second World War, reinforces that there is a strong cohesion within all the 
contemporary Finnish parliamentary party groups(PPGs) throughout time, and that Finnish PPGs 
have increased their cohesion recently. The left-right-narrative has not disappeared, but in order to 
understand the plenary voting preferences of legislators, a multifaceted examination on how party 
cohesion within a given parliament is affected throughout and within the PPGs is of heightened 
interest. No matter what the measuring benchmark is in regards to unity of voting bodies, the 
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comparison between actors is essential. It is meaningful to look for alternative spaces in which to 
look at differences in preference. If a government coalition tends to vote in a single bloc, 
understanding opposition voting could be measured against the government bloc vote. 
It is also important to be aware, that the decrease in cohesion is intertwined in the size of the PPG 
itself. Desposato(2005) points out and suggests how the pitfalls of varying sized parties being 
measured via same cohesion scores could be avoided. The relative size of PPGs and their cohesion 
values is something that should be kept in mind when going through various sets of voting data. 
When looking at ´hotspots´ of decreased cohesion across all the PPGs, the relative change in 
cohesion values can be small. This would imply that the deviance from majority position is an 
outlier. At the same time the same amount of deviance in regards to amount of votes, can be quite 
substantial to a smaller PPG. The smaller PPGs lose cohesion more rapidly, but will never drop to 
as low as a larger PPG would. 
Figure 3. The proportionate effect on party size in regards to cohesion values. Tables represent the 
possible cohesion values of a small party(left) and a party more than three times larger than the 
small party(right). The cohesion value of the smaller party decreases more rapidly if PPG member 
deviates, but the worst possible cohesion can never be as bad as with the larger counterpart. 
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4. REPRESENTATION 
4.1. Fitting Finnish politics into policy space 
The publication by Koivula & al.(2019) discusses the representativeness of Finnish political 
parties by comparing the social status of party members to respondents who themselves claimed 
where most likely to side with any given political party that was available to them to vote. The data 
is very timely in regards to legislative’s actions in 2017. 
Overall, the members of parties tend to be of higher social status than the people that are willing 
side with them by voting. This means that the social standing of the representative differs from that 
of the constituency, and thus one could argue, that the representativeness can be considered 
symbolical. In recent times, the established larger parties had lost member base, while newer 
parties, whose members and voters share opinions with just some hotly debated issues, have risen 
in prominence. To understand this phenomenon, we can look at the negative trend on the amount 
of party membership in Finland(Suomen Vaalitutkimusportaali, 2016). The membership of the 
three largest parties(KESK, KOK, SDP) have decreased to less than half of their size in 1980. This 
is a tell tale sign of voters not being interested in congealing their political beliefs, and that 
political parties might need to move a bit in policy space to get acquainted with their constituency. 
The measurement on the traditional economic left-right scale has been accompanied by the GAL/
TAN scale, both of which illustrate Koivula & al. descriptions. The GAL/TAN is the abbreviation 
for ´Green, Alternative, Libertarian´ opposed to ´Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist´. In a scale 
when the left and right are situated on polar opposites of a horizontal axis, the GAL/TAL cuts them 
vertically from the middle. The TAN end of the spectrum tends to have a strong affiliation to 
Euroscepticism, as demonstrated by Hooghe, Marks & Wilson(2002) in their study of 125 
European political parties. Furthermore, the traditional leftist parties that had formerly been 
assimilated to the labour movement, and have had reservations towards the EU, have moved to the 
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center where supporters of European integration reside. With a few exceptions, this has happened 
with the Green parties all over Europe. What comes to Euroscepticism, Brigevich, Smith & 
Bakker(2017) note that political parties within the western and eastern European party families  are 
distributed differently on both the Left/Right and the GAL/TAN scale. 
The relatively short time eastern European countries had to endure on their own between the eras 
of communist totalitarianism and entering the European Union. This is reckoned to be so because 
of the societal cleavages that had time to develop during the Cold War era, paved a way for the 
traditional pre-Soviet societal cleavages to cement themselves in the power vacuum the Russian 
led socialist empire left behind. This is how the eastern European parties positioned economically 
to the left are inclined to be for law and order, whereas their western counterparts celebrate 
multiculturalism and liberal values. The parties on the extreme right, which have increased their 
support throughout Europe in recent years, are situated deep in the TAN end of the scale. The 
European political party competition evaluation by Marks et al.(2006) describes both the opposite 
radical Left-GAL and Right-TAN as Eurosceptical. However, in eastern Europe, ”…contrast to the 
West, radical Left and radical Tan values tend to combine in the same parties.” 
The Finnish business and policy forum EVA(Elinkeinoelämän Valtuuskunta) published a measure 
over societal values that indicated four of the largest parties in Finland to be more liberal than the 
Finnish populace on average. They are the Swedish People’s Party(RKP), National 
Coalition(KOK), Green League(VIHR), and The Finns Party(PS). The reasons to why this is so, in 
regards to the minor parties, can be attributed to the high levels of attractiveness towards either 
liberal or conservative values on single specific areas of interest among respondents. According to 
the summary notes(Metelinen, 2018), this might echo the shift towards ´identity politics´ that 
downplay robust and broad political agendas in order to focus on single hot issues. As an example 
of this, the Greens would have ideologically been situated left-centrist with the Social 
Democrats(SDP) without having exceptionally high regard towards the freedom of identity. This 
single aspect of the Green Party is so prominent that it drags them on the value chart away from 
other generally likeminded parties such as The Left Alliance and Social Democrats. With the Finns 
Party(PS), who’s low grade on freedom of identity drags them down from the liberal end of the 
scale, ending at somewhere on the same line’s as the Greens(VIHR) on the liberal-conservative-
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axis. To put it another way, The Finns Party could be considered pretty liberal if it weren’t for their 
negative stance towards freedom of identity. The Greens on the other hand would situate 
themselves more conservative left if it weren’t for strong support towards the same thing that The 
Finns are against. In general, The Finns Party tend to be apprehensive towards The Green Party’s 
global environmental outlook. These two parties have a different direction on the scale of 
preference, but they meet somewhere in the same realm. This can be understood, as Metelinen puts 
it, ”being liberal in their mindset, for totally different reasons”. 
In regards to outright populism, Finland is experiencing similar shifts in political partisanship as 
the rest of the western democracies. The acting as cabinet ministers of The Finns Party decided to 
split the party in order to continue the cabinet of PM Sipilä. The cabinet was on the brink of 
toppling due to the other cabinet partners, distrust in the freshly elected new leadership of the 
Finns Party(PS). The new party chairman Jussi Halla-aho had previously appeared in media for 
negative views on immigration in comparison to other party platforms. His writings on cultural 
differences, which the Finnish Supreme Court ordered to be taken down, but published again by 
Keronen(2012), can be considered highly derogatory and offensive. Being elected as the chairman 
of PS, the government coalition partners assumed, that the vote ushered the Halla-aho line on 
immigration to become the new PS mainstream. This was something which the KESK and KOK 
representatives wanted to keep away from(Pitkänen & Westinen, 2019). 
In spite of this systemic cleavage, the Eduskunta is quite peculiar in that its inherent ideological 
divides among MPs have traditionally been curbed to such an extent, that even MPs holding polar 
opposite values on the traditional left-right axis, have been able to establish working coalition 
cabinets(Westinen, 2015, p. 251). 
The studies on voting cohesion address the deviation for members voting within any PPG as 
legislators, balancing their expected utility, whether it be pecuniary or otherwise. The PPG is often 
represented as anthropomorphic. Inside it holds individuals that are simultaneously in debt to the 
constituency and to the party proper for their position in parliament. The preferences of the 
constituency and of the party proper cannot be considered to be uniform because of 
disproportionate information. Given that the party proper is in the position to ´hold enough 
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information to represent´, they will try to perhaps ”please the Downsian median voter”, as 
described by Hindmoor(2005). Because there are more than three parties active in Finnish politics 
at any given time, which are not outright considered to be rational players, we mustn’t delve too 
deeply into Downs’ rationale. However his influence in democratic action can be considered to be 
well established. In a situation where two candidates compete for office, the one with an agenda 
resembling closest to the median voter drawn from normal distribution, wins. When there is more 
than who candidates, the prediction of the probability of winning decreases. McGann, A. J., 
Koetzle, W., & Grofman, B. (2002) urge precaution on emphasizing Downs’ model too lightly. 
Their study suggests than in a situation where the median space is prone to be crowded by a 
multitude of candidates, the winner is situated somewhere between the median voter and the 
population mode. In a sense, when there is glut of preference sharing the space in the proximity of 
the median, winners emerge from unsuspected places. 
4.2. Catch-all, Populism and the Others 
The peculiar aspect of contemporary policy making and the recent evolution of political parties, is 
the aspect of ”catch-all policy” and the ”catch-all party”. These definitions, which are debatable, 
are essentially the ´increased appeasement of a heterogenous mass of voters, by toning down 
established political ideologies that have formerly been in the center of established polities that 
sprout from the idea that political entities represent social classes.´ By looking at how MPs decide 
to act in polarizing plenary voting issues, we can asses whether or not they are `contaminated´ by 
”catch-all preference” and decide to act accordingly. 
The way to achieve this is to look at the PPGs political doctrines and how they manifest in plenary 
voting. On these grounds, and with the tools available, it should also be possible to assess the scale 
to how much catch-all policy is influenced by single politicians or PPGs. For this, it is needed to 
look at what issues decrease PPG voting cohesion  in Eduskunta plenary voting, is the decrease in 
voting cohesion relevant and can the issues being voted on act as nominators to determine whether 
or not the decrease in voting cohesion is caused by catch-all influence. A brief overlook on catch-
all-policy in its earliest for would be as follows: 
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As Europe was in a rebuilding phase once more after the devastation of  the Second World War, 
one Otto Kirchheimer took on the task to understand the recent and yet-to-be-unfolded evolution 
of political parties in Western Europe. His concerns are collected together in the publications of 
Krouwel (2011)and Williams(2009) to unravel Kirchheimers idea, which during his lifetime, as 
well as today, is quite malleable as much as fluid: ´the catch-all party´. There are a number of ways 
that this type of party can be described. 
 1)The catch-all party works to lure voters that do not adhere to the idea of traditional social 
classes that have previously been located the center of established parties’ policy. This means that 
although social classes in previous might not have been fixed, citizens wouldn’t experience  voting 
for a certain party to be signaling of one’s position in social hierarchy. The economic increase of 
Western European nations during the decades following  the Second World War has raised an ever 
increasing amount of average people to make up the middle-class. Citizens from various 
backgrounds start to relish from goods that are available through pecuniary assets, which in turn 
have been made available through technology aided merit, so that former social classes start to lose 
their meaning. 
2) The catch-all party prefers ideological fluidity. This can be considered to be just plain 
revisionism where the prior ideology is tweaked to appear more appealing, or it can be considered 
to be the discarding political ideologies to achieve a similar results. 
3) Catch-all parties tend to have strong and prominent leaders, which convey the party’s vigor and 
4) they take political risks in order to increase their voter base. What this could mean is that a 
catch-all party might relay a message that alienates its traditional constituency, but simultaneously 
increases the appeal to the median voter in order to increase popularity. Kirchheimer was worried 
that established parties would gradually be contaminated by ´catch-all-ism´. 
The race to catch the median voter has become more of an attractive action. In the absence of 
traditional interest group backing, which the large established parties have a firm grip on, the 
smaller new parties have campaigned with polarizing issues such as climate, income redistribution, 
immigration and suspicion towards the globalism. Most effectively growing their voter base, the 
Finns Party(PS) and the Green League(Vihr.) have located themselves to the opposite poles of the 
social dimension. These new parties also communicate their message of increasing democracy, by 
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aiming to decrease power distance between the party proper and their constituencies. What this 
means is what message populist parties in Europe(and elsewhere in the developed world) try to 
narrate to their would-be-supporters, that they represent the will of the people and democracy in its 
purest form(Bowler et al., 2017). It should also be put into consideration, that if we consider this 
meaning that the increase of direct democracy from the populist viewpoint aiming to reduce power 
of representatives in decision making, there is also discontent towards political referendums, and 
voters vent their frustration by siding with populists. In a populist worldview, representative elite 
politicians, are more ´middlemen´, than representatives of the common folk. This hints to the 
possibility, that direct democracy to elect a populist candidate also comes with the preference of 
increased centralization of power, which echoes the ´catch-all party´ position of having a powerful 
leader in the reins. -Whether this is true or not, it should be noted that the European populist 
movements of recent decades have overwhelmingly been lead by powerful rhetoric of single 
individuals. 
In the Finnish example, it was the change of chairman of a populist party that brought about the 
event of the Finnish government resignation in 2017, as well as the split of The Finns Party. We 
mustn’t discredit the notion of populism when looking through these issues. According to 
Riker(1988, 11-14), the populist interpretation of voting as a vessel of democracy in action is 
moral, almost magical quality to it in comparison to a liberal view, where voting is a tool, a means 
to an end result. 
The Koivula et al.(2019) data is timely in regards to the inner workings of Finnish politics during 
2017, as it was in part collected after the Sipilä cabinet took office in 2015 and before the summer 
of the 2017 parliamentary year. The results regarding issues on income inequality, immigration and 
climate, positioned the Finns and the Greens as polar opposites. The results didn’t support the 
hypothesis that smaller parties have reduced social status differences between party members and 
voters, not at least how members and voters themselves perceive it. However, it is evident that the 
Finns have tapped into the voters, which are likely to be against outside threats such as increase of 
immigration. The opposing sides in social issues tend to race towards the median voter, and 
meeting at the center on the left-right-axis. However, in unaccustomed events, it could be that the 
so-called median is not situated in the place we expect it to be. In the case of the Finns Party, or 
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any other European populist party for that matter, a crisis can act as an aid in gaining ground over 
mainstream parties. As implied by Ylä-Anttila(2017), the economic concerns over the northern EU 
countries bailing out their southern counterparts debts was the backdrop of the populist landslide in 
the Finnish parliamentary elections in 2011. The Finns Party managed to sell the Finnish populace 
the idea that the eurozone elite was fooling Finland to pay for expenses they themselves didn’t 
have the possibility to enjoy. The mainstream parties rushing towards the median value position 
found their expected voter base thinned as the attractiveness of agendas had shifted away from the 
mainstream, and into areas where xenophobia and opposition of elites reside. When large parties 
rush to the Centre, trying to conquer the hearts and minds of the median voter, the policy space of 
the median voters becomes crowded for many simultaneous actors. Simultaneously the fringe 
policy space leaves its (smaller compared to the mainstream)policy actors more proliferated in 
comparison to the larger parties. What is also important to note with this kind of populist 
phenomenon, is that it is enforced by the fact that populist agendas are not immediately accessible 
to the mainstream parties, as they would need time to either convince the electorate of their 
position as counter-populist elite or wait for the voters to forget this. It seems that if the policy 
space where the larger parties fish for voters, gets crowded, and simultaneously the policies 
untouchable to the larger parties increase, the populist party might get the upper hand. 
When one tries to understand how political parties establish their activities, it can be beneficial to 
look at are the differences which separate the parties from one another. This means that it is useful 
to arrange the ideological aspects of several political parties in a common space. One could argue, 
that a party is the way it is because another party is stands for something else. Established political 
parties tend to carry a lot of historical baggage with them in terms of who’s been supporting them 
across time. 
4.3. Power Triad is shaken 
In the case of Finland, the brief and compact summary by Sundberg(1994) opens up the way 
political parties have experienced pressure to become more dynamic in their relation to voters, and 
also to evolve to legitimize their place in a post-industrial society. This is important to note, 
because the largest political parties in Finland have grown connected to interest organizations 
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whose original function was to mobilize social classes before and during industrialization. The 
social democrats(SDP) where tightly connected to labor unions, of whose power the employer 
organizations where actively trying to curb, manifesting in the policies of the bourgeoisie party, 
National Coalition(KOK). The Agrarian League, later to be known as the Centre Party(KESK), 
where focusing establishing voter bases in the rural areas and their producers’ organizations whilst 
Finland, as it happens, was a late bloomer in industrialization(Michelsen, Kuisma, 1992). 
Paradoxically this has made The Centre Party the largest party both organizationally and by 
support, however it is practically a pariah in the largest metropolitan area. These, the largest three 
and their intermingling strifes have had a huge influence on how Finnish politics has developed 
into during a century of independence. The concentration of power to the organization close to the 
largest three parties has not gone unnoticed, but the vicarious way the interest organizations and 
the parties have conducted their mutual businesses, seem to have cemented the largest parties into 
their top positions. This could be considered as a text book example of the workings of a ´mass 
party´. 
Christoforos Vernardakis(2012) examined the evolution of mass parties in his publication 
involving the peculiarities of Greek political parties. The emergence of the PASOK party after the 
tumultuous era of ´dictatorship of the colonels´ was in its essence, a populist movement. The 
feeding of the population’s urge to increase consumption via the adaption economic liberalism 
spiraled to excesses where prosperity started to become a borrowed asset. As these economic 
failings overflowed into the everyday occurrences of the people, meaning that the people’s credit 
became intertwined to the support of the ruling populist policy, it was only a matter of time when 
Greece needed a helping hand from other EU member states in order to pursue the upkeep of their 
normalized level of consumption(Arvanitopoulos, 2018). The irony of the Greek case is that 
populist policy can vicariously be the result of EU-critical populism seeping into the parliamentary 
realms of other western democracies. Finland was one of these countries. Because this power play 
is intricately connected to social classes, the constituencies’ views on who belongs to what social 
class cannot be discarded up front in legitimizing power allocation between parties. Because of the 
conjointment of a political party and an interest group begets payoffs, the questioning of the role of 
the interest group in society is prone to affects the probability of the large parties’ ultimate payoffs 
negatively. The Greek government bailout of 2010, being negotiated between PM Papandreou and 
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the European Troika, was so unpopular within the EU, that within a year parties like the Finns 
Party had swollen from a fringe group, to a key player in Finnish politics. 
Looking at the movement in policy space by French parties in the Fifth Republic, Hale 
Williams(2009) is inclined to conclude that over time the French political parties displayed 
centralizing tendencies in their policy. This could mean that the assumptions Kichheimer made as a 
contemporary, about political parties evolving to catch the median voter where feasible, but in the 
French case happened regardless of political parties. In addition to this, the assumption that catch-
all tendency would undermine small parties was premature. The organization itself, regardless of 
size, can be a substantive determinant. 
In the 2009 publication by Christoper S. Allen, the ´catch-all-party thesis´ is assessed against the 
political events of Germany and Sweden. In both of these cases, the social democrats mended their 
policies in order to engage with the median voter in the political center. This sort of movement was 
initially very similar to what Kirchheimer originally predicted would happen when large political 
entities form political alliances to catch a larger share of voters. This activity revealed itself to be 
unfit to retrieve long lasting political prowess. When the social democrats seemed to abandon heir 
proletarian roots, the voters that found appeasement in these traditional cleavages turned to other, 
more opportunistic movements on the fringes of the same political space that the social democrats 
now thought of as worthy of neglect. As the EU grew and blue collar voters found aspects as 
globalism and increased immigration suspicious, former fringe groups as Green and Leftist parties 
became more prominent, as they didn’t have to fight as much for the left wing voters who the 
social democratic parties ´left to their own devices´, to establish voter base within higher educated 
technocrats and middle class. Before the first decade of the 21 century had come to a close, the 
catch-all policy of moving towards right-to-the-center, had made the renewed social democracy 
lose its dominance. This sort of activity seems to have opened a gateway to other movements from 
the fringes of Western politics. 
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5. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Distinguishing voting blocs is something that has been of great interest in scholars studying large 
voting bodies such as the United Nations General Assembly(UNGA), as well as the United States 
Congress. The overlying assertion is that voting blocs tend to form even in situations where 
legislative voters tend to vote unison based on common agendas and policy even without mutual 
counsel. The work of Ball(1951), MacRae(1954) and Lijphart(1963) are quite robust in findings 
about voting in unison being more prevalent with groups that share attributes of geographical or 
demographical similarity. However, by utilizing statistical data, we can achieve increased certainty 
that the discovered results are not contaminated by policy issues alone, as cohesion across the 
legislature might appear in unexpected places. This means that possible log-rolling policies of 
voting blocs can result in unexpected and counter intuitive movement across policy lines. This 
means that elected officials will work/vote counter to their own policy in order to please political 
opponents, expecting the opponent to return the favor. 
A meaningful way to determine the position of any party in any given policy, is to make 
comparison between other political actors regarding concurrent issues. The publication by Poole & 
Rosenthal(1985) and also of Ordeshook(1986) demonstrate the movement of legislators in policy 
space. The legislators might not only move in counterintuitive directions, but do not necessarily 
have perfect knowledge of outcomes or the movement of rival factions. Therefore there’s room for 
error, not only about where the movement in policy space is headed, but what exactly is the 
countermeasure for the movement. 
Even in situations where the movement is based on single ´Yes´ and ´No´ alternatives(and in lot of 
the cases this is the way the situations are framed), we should be able to scrutinize whether the 
countermovement of ´Yes´ opposed to ´No´), is headed to an opposite direction in policy space, or 
perhaps even the same direction with varying volume. In addition, possible selection biases on the 
data are prone to appear if not all of the data is available(Hug, 2005). 
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The influential study by Sieberer(2006) on the cohesion of eleven Western parliamentary 
democracies since 1945, not only outlines the terminology of cohesion studies, but also describes 
the troubles of representation among MPs as a mouthpiece of their own constituency, as well as the 
constituency of the entire PPG. The central themes in cohesion studies are the unity of preference, 
as well as the underlying threat of punitive measures aimed at keeping the voting bloc in check. In 
regards to deviating from PPG line, the most volatile PPG members are the ones that in the 
Westminster style system would be called ´backbenchers´, the ones without larger responsibility to 
speak on behalf of the PPG, or who do not hold a portfolio. 
The task of finding uncontaminated information from voting data is difficult, as the measures 
inside PPGs aimed at increasing cohesion can make the MPs vote in a manner that is signaling 
false unity. The study by Carubba, Gabel & Hug (2008) make it very clear, that if parliamentary 
roll call votes are requested because they are a measure of ensuring maximum cohesion, the 
specifically requested votes themselves do not indicate genuine preference. The PPGs variety on 
opinion, size, as well as the initiate positioning in policy space make the movement within policy 
space difficult to predict in a single universal manner. 
The study on European Union states voting cohesion within the United Nations General Assembly 
by Hosli et al.(2010) demonstrates how the enlargement of the EU can be seen as a catalyst for an 
enforcement of European states to vote as a single voting bloc. The voting data from UNGA 
sessions from the 1950s onward up until the beginning of the 21st century reveal the gradual 
curbing of the variety of voting options European member states have preferred. The options in this 
case being the ´Yes´, ´No´ or to ´Abstain´. The comparative number of ´No´ votes starts do decline 
as Italy enters the EU, but until new member states enter, a bulge of ´Abstain´ votes emerges, until 
dwindling in the end of the 1980s. At this time the proportionate amount of ´Yes´ votes starts to 
dominate the representative votes, as the proportionate amount of agreeability increased. It is 
feasible to think that legislation such as the Single European Act(SEA) enforced in 1987, brought 
about the shift towards a heightened unity among the EU states in UNGA, mirroring the unity it had 
overall. The constant sum game of voting in an environment such as UNGA can result in situations 
of poor cohesion, where the shares of voting possibilities are equally distributed, meaning the lack 
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of unity. With time and active lobbying of common unifying themes, unity grows, meaning that one 
voting option might become dominant. 
In Finnish context, Subgrouping the voting data is something that helps in determining the 
preferences of both single legislators and PPGs. The work by Pajala(2010) distinguishes the themes 
voted in the plenary sessions of the Finnish Parliament Eduskunta. These are subcategories that 
extract hidden information about legislator preference. The personal preferences for an MP are the 
pork-barrel amendments that can be issued regarding a bill. These sort of amendments can only be 
issued regarding the MPs own district, and can therefore be vital to the legislators future career 
prospects as a representative of a constituency. The budgetary votes are dominant in Eduskunta, and 
their amount somewhat skew the cohesion values compared to similar parliament settings. This 
means that the votes that show prominent decrease in cohesion on both government and opposition 
sides, tend not to be budgetary votes. What it comes to abstentions, they are regarded as a rare event 
in Eduskunta. The importance of plenary votes can be determined on whether they are the final 
votes or not. The final votes cannot be altered by amendments. 
In the study on the cohesion of the Icelandic Althingi, Kristinsson(2011) argues that some votes 
might be technical in nature, and therefore the final votes are essential in determining whether the 
cohesion value on the issue has validity. The Icelandic roll call votes in plenary sessions are scarce 
and the relative small size of the parliament itself makes it possible for single MPs to request a roll 
call vote. Also, the way MPs are selected in the Althingi is, at least compared to other Northern 
European counterparts, very inclusive. This should decrease cohesion due to lack of centralized 
structures in nomination. The primaries are open and the lay members of parties are usually 
included in the selection of party delegates. The party cohesion in the Icelandic Althingi is however 
not affected negatively from this sort of openness in the selection of its policy-makers. 
Whether or not the final votes on bills is thought of as important to legislators, the study by 
Mühlböck & Yordanova(2012) present the Members of European Parliament(MEPs) by acting out 
agency of two principles. As with national parliaments, the MEPs have commitments to higher, in 
this case the transnational European Parliament level, as also on a national level. The roll-call votes 
in the EP are expected to be, as much as in any parliament for that matter, prone to both acting out 
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in fear of penalizing by the group and by signaling expected cohesiveness. The introduction of 
automated final roll-call votes in the EP since 2009 might have made the former selection bias(roll-
call votes on request) disappear and thus make the data on cohesion more robust. Expecting to find 
cohesion on roll-call votes decrease due to the diminishing of whipping or urge in signaling, the 
opposite happened. Cohesion increased possibly because the automation of roll-call votes of less 
important issues made MEPs more relaxed in siding with the EPG line. 
Measuring the cohesion of several PPGs against one another should at least be a determinant of the 
position PPGs take on the economic Left/Right axis, where the Right represents the increased 
economic power for the individual, as the Left represents safeguarding the masses by concentrating 
economic power to the realm of the state. 
Pajala(2013) graphically demonstrates the movement in policy space in the work involving 
Eduskunta plenary votes since World War II up until the year 2011. For exemplifying the movement 
in policy space, several plenary vote mean values prior 1991 are discussed in order to understand 
the current state of Eduskunta cohesion. The plenary votes after 1991, deemed the third era of 
plenary vote legacy in Finland, is the most salient involving contemporary plenary sessions. The 
government cohesion has strong unity against the coalition of a heterogenous body of the 
opposition, which loses their shared total cohesion time and time again. The model which is aimed 
to deepen the knowledge retrieved through the Rice Index(Figure 1.), compares the position of the 
opposition against the strong cohesion of the government coalitions strongest cohesive point. The 
model yields vectors showcased as a fan that indicates how far the opposition parties are in 
comparison to the right most position of the government coalition. Simplistically, the government 
coalition, being the primary catalyst for drawing legislature, tends to have incentive to be cohesive 
simply for this reason. Therefore the government standpoint mean can act as a benchmark for 
everything else that happens, primary what the opposition coalition decides to vote. 
Political parties are not unitary in form. According to Katz & Mair(1993), the organizational 
structures, activities and evolution of parties depend on, among other things, their supporter base 
and their positioning in a market space of voter-attractable ideas. The central office is a place 
where, at least in a nominal sense, the party policy decides and is distributed further. The central 
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office is of primary importance to ´mass parties of integration´, which have corresponded to the 
political needs for representation of a specific subset of society. Traditional labor movements are an 
example of this. The central office is however of little significance to a ´cadre party´, as it is 
generally clustered around single powerful candidates and their issues, as well as keeping the power 
distance between delegates and lay members short. This sort of party works more or less as a 
´utility maximizing company´, aiming to centralize power to its own elites. 
The perception of the types of parties and their evolution is further portrayed by Enroth(2017). He 
argued that phenomena such as cartellization of political parties does not necessarily mean that 
these parties do absolutely not represent their constituencies, but the problem is that it is difficult to 
retrieve the information when and how representation takes place, if it does take place. 
When a mass party of integration orientates to act as a catch-all party, (it is argued)this results in the 
central office losing power to public officials that aim to convey the party message to the electorate 
by more direct means. In this sort of circumstance, the central office becomes more of a service 
provider. Hence the parties are predisposed to a constant sum game (The constant sum being the 
total number of eligible voters of all of the political entities)to attract following, as well as the 
possibility(or increased probability)of change in conduct. 
As Wolinetz(2002) described it, as a party begins to compete in elections, it wakes up from its 
slumber to fulfill the role of a traditional ´mass party´ or a ´cadre party´. The party gets together for 
a fervent discussion of its policies and about the measures to reach the electorate. The parties that 
engage in ´catch-all policy´, the catching of the undecided electorate by stretching the boundaries of 
the party’s sphere of influence are of great interest in the study of western democracies. This is 
caused by the pressure of the traditional parties, acquiring their votes from traditional socio-
economical cleavages, to look for new voter bases from an increasing middle-class society. The 
movement in looking for these new areas of support can be either from left to right of vice versa. 
This sort of movement involves the dilution of at least some aspects of the party’s ideology, but the 
most intriguing part of this sort of action, is that other parties might be prone to be contaminated by 
this sort of activity as well. 
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Wolinetz aimed at establishing a new way of classifying party properties by their aimed end results, 
for which there are three. The ´policy seekers´ work to achieve a foothold in policy space by 
attractive ideas of how liberal democracy could work. Their policies can be left and liberal, as well 
as right wing with well defined policies. The ´vote-seekers´ aim to win elections everywhere 
possible and utilize non-political marketing machinery with a small and tight-knit central party 
organization. Example of this being the German Christian Democratic Union. The ´office -seekers´ 
are ready to give up rigid policy goals to get into power. Their position towards political 
competition cannot be too harsh, because of their objective is to be able to establish affluent 
coalitions with increased payoffs for themselves. Though varying in size, they are usually 
connected with established interest groups in order to function. These descriptions are not to be 
taken as strict ones, but help to understand the ways political parties in western democracies move 
in policy space. It is possible that by catching a larger amount of votes in elections, parties use a 
composite of ways to achieve their objectives. Therefore there isn’t just catch-all parties that 
suddenly arrive in the political arena, but established parties can adopt policies that help them move 
about in a catch-all manner. However, according to Wolinetz, it is the ´vote-seeking parties´ that 
tend to be the ´catch-all parties´ that are volatile from election to election. These parties take risks, 
downplay ideology and their policies are directed by their leader. 
Political coalition do not only happen when likeminded parties work together. In fact, the study of 
political coalitions has for a long time tried to find the right nominators in understanding the 
payoffs coalition partners are expected to get. As illustrated by Hix et a.(2005) about the cohesion 
of the European Parliament, the pivotal players in a coalition can sometimes be small parties that 
supplement the policies of the larger parties. By pivotal it is meant that the small parties can act as a 
tool to achieve the minimal winning coalition. There is also the possibility to build a coalition 
through minimal agreeability, which could be an explanation for large and comparatively 
homogenous groups sticking together despite of disagreements on national level. 
The paper by Hindmoor(2005) about the British New Labour rising to new prominence in the 1990s 
has reservations about the economic model by Downs(1957) about political parties’ movement in 
policy space. It is true that the New Labour changed their policy derived from their prominent 
political thinkers from the beginning of the 20th century(Gani, 2015). By decreasing the emphasis 
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on the tracts of the UK Labour Party’s which had socialist connotations. Eventually the constitution 
was rewritten as to be more attractive to the median voter, leading to the then Labour leader Tony 
Blair to become the youngest Prime Minister since 1812. Hindmoor argued that although the New 
Labour was able to catch the majority vote by moving right in policy space, it was also able to make 
the electorate to perceive the the Labour movement in a new light. The peculiar aspect of this, 
according to Hindmoor, was that the Downsian model suggests the voters having perfect 
information on policy. Therefore its presumptions on the prevailing of the New Labour could have 
differed to what actually occurred. 
The description of political position grown out of proportion does not help understanding how 
political entities go about their business. The enrichment of policy space with additional direction to 
take(in addition to socio-economical Left and socio-economical Right) can help at pinpointing more 
accurately the political party´s or party group´s course. In the work by Benoit & Laver(2006), the 
geographic of the subjective policy space of a party illustrates why individuals holding differing 
political believes find it hard to work together, and also the fact that the subjective differences in the 
political landscape can help in interpreting group(as to some degree the individuals´)political 
actions. But the problem that is encapsulated within, is that the political positioning does not only 
involve the positioning of a political entity in policy space given a specific issue, but also the way 
the other political entities move within the same political space. Therefore the preferences of 
political entities(such as PPGs in this case) cannot be necessarily examined without looking at the 
preferences of similar entities that move in the same policy space. Quoting Benoit & Laver(2006) 
”Indeed humans who are… unable to see the world through the eyes of others… are typically 
considered… mentally disturbed and or sociopathic.” 
It is very difficult to create a single universal model for political competition. The policy 
dimensions considered important to one party, may not be considered at all important to the next. 
Therefore, when the party adjusts its position on issues, the movement in policy space depicting the 
event, is subjective to the party´s preferences. In other words, the actions political parties take in 
regards to issues do not yield a certain sort of outcome. Due to the mutable components that 
characterize the political party, it is often depicted as an anthropomorphic actor. To find the policy 
dimensions that are most important to any given party in any given setting, it could be helpful to 
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flesh out the most important data involved by assessing whether it is natural data or just second 
hand information. The former can be used to formalize the technical nature of phenomena such as 
voting cohesion, whereas the latter, such as information derived from interview data, are always 
more susceptible to a range of biases. An example of this could be that the person being interviewed 
gives answers that he/she thinks the interviewee wants to hear. The problem with this sort of data 
acquisition is that the information gathered really manifests itself during the interview, unlike 
datasets that are formed through party actors ´on the go´. The electronically collected data from 
plenary votes is one of these circumstances. To make movement in policy space more easily 
understandable, Benoit & Laver(2006, p.72) approach the issue with an allegory. The visual 
perception of the human eye for color is multifaceted and is usually controlled by things like ´hue´ , 
´brightness´. The colors on a computer screen look different when any one of these aspects are 
adjusted. However, in order for the human eye to see the color change, the adjustable values are 
connected to a degree. ”… Hue of an object cannot be assigned without also assigning its 
brightness…”. To understand this allegory we can go back to the political positioning of the 
Eduskunta parties PS and Vihr., which in spite of their massive differences in one axis, led them to 
have similarities in another. 
The scale of socio-economics is the most used metric to identify a preferred policy for a party. In 
the Finnish context these aspects of both ´social´ and ´economical´ are rather distinct from one 
another, and drive policy on which ever side a party tends to take. In comparison, political parties in 
European countries have their character defined by the position on EU-polity. In Finland this aspect 
of political parties tends to be weak(Benoit & Laver, 2006, p. 132). 
The  study of the socio-economic left-right factor doesn’t explain everything about policy, nor does 
it help in integrating an infinite amount of additional factors if the results should be kept elegant. 
However, the position a party takes on a certain issue will affect its movement on the socio-
economic scale (Benoit & Laver, 2006, p. 153). An example of this could be the stance a political 
party takes towards environmental policy, encompassing the preference of(among others)lowering 
carbon emissions and curbing deforestation. If a party looks at there sort of values favorably, it can 
affect its velocity and distance in the movement on the socio-economic left-right-axis.  
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Environmentalist parties typically situate themselves on the left side of the Likert scale. Therefore 
their preferences lie within the direction of a strong state control of economic resources. Therefore 
it is in their position to favor the distributing of government subsidies towards environmental 
issues, rather than calling for the same end results be met by the power of market liberalization. The 
movement from left to right is therefore more rigid than the other way around, unless there are other 
grave issues that play part in the introduction of such measures. The positioning on the right is of 
economic self-determination, which ultimately coexists with individual responsibility(of one’s own 
opportunity cost at least). Therefore on a longer timespan, all other things equal, the movement 
from right to left is a safer bet than movement towards left to right. This example, which is not 
applicable in real life, illustrates the theoretical movement in a single policy dimension by 
supposing that the opportunity of a shared cost trumps the opportunity of shared responsibility. 
Looking for a publication that can help at getting as broad a picture as possible about legislative 
voting, Hix & Noury's ´Government-Opposition or Left-Right´(2016) is comprehensive. The study 
takes into account the possibilities hinted by previous publications about the importance of party 
positioning on the Government-Opposition axis as opposed to simply determining whether policy 
is driven by a traditional ideological left-right split. The vast amount of data looks at the legislative 
votes in sixteen parliaments across the world, which utilize roll call voting in its decision making. 
Legislators, as the representatives of their constituency, are expected to have payoff to please the 
constituency, as their respected cost have been to cast a vote. They are in a position of being the 
agent in multiple principle-agent-problems. They are responsible to both the constituency as well 
as the party. Connected into this is the cost the legislator might suffer from voting against coalition 
or party lines. These aims become blurred as the issues are decided in a case-by-case-manner, and 
the expected payoffs are covered by the general will of the Government or Opposition. 
The backlash to post-materialistic ideas within the general populace feeds polarization and 
decreases willingness for public debate. One could argue that populism only describes the other 
side of the argument. If there is a huge increase in polarization, there could possibly be an umbrella 
term to help understand the political polar opposites moving about simultaneously. This is why 
societal occurrences and political cleavages resulting from it could perhaps be looked at through 
(but not being restricted to)the idea of ´catch-all policy´ and how it has evolved after the concerns 
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Kirchheimer had about the post WWII Europe(Safran, 2009). The policies of both Nazi Germany 
where so close in recent memory at this point, that the party that ´catches all´ was undoubtedly 
formed from the trepidation that such totalitarianism would possibly happen again. The idea 
behind this was that a party that can gain control over extra-parliamentary actors such as trade 
unions, and at the same time have populist attractiveness towards the majority of voters, can also 
actively reduce the strength of a possible opposition. Kirchheimer also saw that the influence of 
mass media would make politics a game of unbridled popularity seeking. Because of the horrors of 
WWII still in recent memory, the original envisaged causal chain had the end result being 
something on the lines of what happened in Germany when a fringe group suddenly becomes the 
largest party and starts to impose its doctrines to everyone else. Kirchheimer didn’t live to see the 
emergence of post-materialistic movements in western democracies, and that they would be 
complimented by political parties from various ideological standpoints. Environmentalism or 
nationalist fervor in Europe and in the United States have personal appeal in the voting public in 
an era where real fears of totalitarism, either of the left or right, glooms in the distant past. 
When looking at the overarching interest for populist policy in western democracies, insecurity for 
one’s wellbeing is something that, according to Inglehart & Norris(2017), acts as the catalysts in 
the  disdain towards post-materialistic outlook on life and society in general. Generally speaking, 
the possibilities of a high standard of living overall increased interest towards a post-materialistic 
outlook. This is generally the interest in social equity. In recent decades, the composition of the 
political parties increasing their sphere of influence within Europe has revealed peculiarities in 
how these parties work, as portrayed by Marks et al(2006). If we would need to look at statistical 
measures which could demonstrate the changes illustrates the position the populations of western 
democracies have, the life expectancy measure is something that is worth looking at. High income 
countries have experienced increase in life expectancy for decades, but during recent years life 
expectancy has stagnated and with some countries, turned to the decrease. In the United States, life 
expectancy has stagnated in comparison to other high income societies. According to the study by 
Ho & Hendi(2018), this trend paints a shadow of suspicion about life expectancy in the US. A 
question can also emerge, about whether or not this trend is correlated in some way with the same 
insecurities that spawn materialistic viewpoints. 
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In Europe, the ways political parties act out their role in policy space differs depending on where , 
and in which country, the party is situated. In addition to this, the parties that are either left- or 
right wing, grab on to ideas considered to be populist in different ways. Left wing parties tend to 
take differing roles in western Europe, than in the former Soviet block. Being at the epicenter of 
the dissolution of the iron curtain, the newly unified Germany of the late 1990s could be 
considered an interlude to the populist wave that emerged in the wake of massive European 
integration of the 2010s. However, populism didn’t come right after the Cold War ended. 
Something else happened first. The German SPDs acts to delude its connotation on labor class and 
tried to attract the attention of voters of a higher social status. Initially it worked much the same 
way as with the New Labour movement in the United Kingdom(Blyth & Katz, 2005). However, 
the alienation from the base following through catch-all policies can arguably make a party’s 
position erratic, as the former mass following of these parties started to look for ´non-elitist´ 
candidates(Patton, 2014). 
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6. EVENTS LEADING TO ´JUNE´ 
6.1. Old trends and new 
Finnish parliamentary democracy has a history predating its independence. Finland enjoys the 
oldest universal suffrage in Europe and election results are determined by the d´Hondt 
formula(Nurmi & Nurmi, 2015). The makeup of socio-political cleavages in Finland is illustrated 
by the presence of four influential political parties throughout the history of Eduskunta. These 
parties are the Centre Party(KESK), National Coalition Party(KOK), Social Democratic Party(SDP) 
and the Swedish People’s Party(RKP). The Swedish speaking minority has had RKP established as 
a power base to uphold the culture of Swedish speakers, meaning mainly to withhold the position of 
Swedish language as the the second language of rule, side by side with Finnish. 
During the decades before entering the Second World War and many decades after, the 
parliamentary system was relatively unstable if measured by the longevity of cabinets. The tables 
that illustrate the work of Laver & Schofield(1998, p. 148), tell the tail of immense instability in 
cabinet composition up until the 1970s. During the time after 1945 up until 1971, the average 
lifecycle of an acting cabinet was only thirteen months. The average amount of political parties 
involved in these cabinets was five. For comparison’s sake, the average lifecycle of twelve western 
European cabinets(including the nordic countries Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark) 
during the same timeframe, was 27 months. The average amount of parties involved(including 
Finland) was 3.4. This however doesn’t mean outright that the excess amount of parties tend to 
make the cabinet volatile  to imploding. What it might suggest, is that too many cooks working on 
the same dish, might `botch the seasoning`. What this means is, that the cabinets are more durable 
when the majority coalition cabinets that are either single majority, or minimum winning cabinets 
compared to the Opposition. They also tend to last longer than cabinets that have a surplus in 
majority. An allegory of this would be like there is too much parties sharing the goods. It seems that 
a minimum winning cabinet is almost as strong as a majority cabinet. 
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The way Finnish cabinets have been formed seems to have an enormous urge for inclusivity, 
meaning that common burdens of the nation should be shouldered together(Westinen, 2015 p. 251) 
The three large parties introduced earlier, radiate the tripolar balance (Westinen, 2015 p. 82) of 
power based on established socio-socio-political cleavages. The National Coalition(KOK), which, 
from its establishment in 1918, has kept close ties to the employer organizations and has splintered 
once when the Christian Democrats(KD) formed their own fringe group based on christian 
nationalism that opposed increasing socio-liberal attitudes. 
The current Social Democratic movement in Finland is based on the work of the minority group 
that abandoned violent efforts in the wake of the Finnish civil war. It splintered the in the 1950s, 
when the group coining itself The Social Democratic Union of Workers and Smallholders(TPSL) 
were worried about the SDPs leadership’s efforts in trying to dilute the emphasis on class struggle 
and pull the party in the direction of a catch-all party in regards to ideology. The Finnish Social 
Democrats trace their history to the end of the 19th century and have been the main party backed by 
the labor unions, the same way as its nordic counterparts. One thing it doesn’t share with its nordic 
counterparts, is the skepticism towards EU integration. Quite the opposite, it was the Finnish SDP 
with its allies that were originally thought of entering the EU could be the best way to achieve 
political goals(Raunio, 2010). 
The Centre Party(KESK) with its heritage of supporting the agricultural producers as well as small 
farmers, has had its supporters spread across the sparsely populated country. The small farmers 
grievances towards large agricultural producers has made it a coalition collaborator in various 
cabinets with the Social Democrats(SDP). The tensions inside the Centre Party(KESK) resulted in 
the establishing of the Finnish Rural Party(SMP), which had a formidable success with its rhetoric 
of a new cleavage between the political establishment and the common people. Eventually the SMP 
also split because of personality differences. The splinter group this time being the Finnish People’s 
Unity Party(SKYP). SMP experienced severe financial troubles and consequent bankruptcy in the 
wake of the Finnish recession of the 1990s(Arter, 2010) and its active members ultimately found a 
political home from the new Finns Party(PS) led by Timo Soini. The Finns Party(PS) splintered 
once more during 2017, curbing the distrust between coalition members and enabling for the Sipilä 
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cabinet to remain in power. The splinter group see-sawed on what would be an appropriate name for 
the new party, but eventually settled in Blue Reform(Sininen Tulevaisuus, SIN). Therefore, possibly 
because of the changing cleavage structure in the developed world, the splintering of parties seem 
to be more prevalent in the former agricultural section(base of which is KESK)of the Finnish power 
politics tripolarity. 
Political parties splitting is not a new phenomenon in Finland. However, there are only few cases 
where a formerly non-existing or unknown political entity suddenly arrives, increasing its holdings 
of substantial power in Eduskunta. The classic example of this is the sudden emergence of the 
Finnish People’s Democratic League(SKDL), that was a left-wing cooperation party mostly 
consisting of members supporting communist ideals(Ruosteenoja, 2007, p.4). In historical 
perspective, SKDLs arrival on the political stage in October 1944  happened exactly after the ban 
on communist activities in Finland had been lifted a month earlier. In the 1945 parliamentary 
elections SKDL prevailed as the second largest party in Eduskunta with almost a quarter of the 
seats. 
Another surprising turn in Finnish Parliamentary democracy was the landslide victory by the Finns 
Party in the 2011 parliamentary elections, resulting in the increase of 34 seats in the 200 seat 
Eduskunta. The reason why the split of The Finns party should perhaps also be considered as a 
similar turning point in Finnish parliamentary democracy, to that of the events of 1945 and 2011, is 
because the splinter group Blue Reform managed to keep on to several important cabinet portfolios. 
There are two sides to this. Although a fringe group holding the positions of Foreign minister, 
Minister of Defense, Minister for Sport Culture and European Affairs, Minister of Social Affairs 
and Health and Minister of Labour, the estimated budget of all of these ministries exceeds that of 
the ministries held by the largest party (KESK) by almost four fold. According to Laver & 
Schofield(1998, p. 172-174), it seems that in several European democracies, larger parties in the 
coalition tend to give away portfolios to smaller parties that act as a sort of an auxiliary force in the 
building of a coalition. Cabinet building is a constant sum game, where the larger players lure 
smaller parties into cooperation with cabinet portfolios that might seem attractive, but take a huge 
chunk of the state budget compared to the ministries held by e.g. the party of the Prime Minister. 
This could be used as a way of finding a scapegoat in advance if things at the end of the term don’t 
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work out very well with such ´expensive´ ministries such as the Ministry Social Affairs and Health 
or the Ministry of Education and Culture(Valtion budjetti, 2019). 
6.2. Populism creeping over 
The wording frequently used in trying to describe recent political upheaval in western Europe, is 
´the rise of populism´. This phenomenon’s rise to prominence has of rising interest to scholars of 
the political discipline ever since the Euro Crisis of 2008. Outlined by Copelovitch, Frieden & 
Walter(2016), the crisis was due to disproportionate intra-European growth, leading to incentivizing 
of lending in certain areas of the European Monetary Union(EMU). To give a realistic picture of 
what sort of phenomenon is at hand, the study by Algan et al.(2017) which distresses that the 
increased economic instability has fueled both distrust in governments in the western developed 
world, as it has fueled distrust in interpersonal relations. 
Not all of EU member states have experienced the near catastrophic unemployment levels like that 
in the southern most parts of Europe, but it seems that the relative amount of interest in populist 
policy is more prevalent in regions most hit by effects of globalism such as unemployment. The 
rising discontent towards elected leaders is also supported by Pew Research(2013). The anti 
establishment upheaval of the masses on different parts of Europe become localized inside 
countries. An example of this could be the right-wing populism in the north of Italy, which has 
experienced very different circumstances than the south of the country. The distrust in transnational 
political bodies and their representativeness across Europe has spawned the electoral success of 
both populist Left and populist Right depending on which one taps into the vein of a certain 
region’s national sentiment. 
Unemployment seems to have a strong effect on the peripheral economic losers of globalization 
and resulted in the population starting to favor regional nationalistic ideals. Examples of this are the 
French Front Nationale, AfD in Germany, the Austrian Freedom Party, Jobbik in Hungary, Golden 
Dawn of Greece, the Swedish Democrats and UKIP in Britain. However, because of the 
phenomenon is affecting all high income democracies, we can see parallels to Donald Trump being 
elected president of the United States. Because insecurities are not only the breeding ground to right 
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wing parties, we can also see left-wing populist fringe groups, such as Podemos in Spain, 
experiencing relative rise in popularity. It is documented that historical economic insecurities have 
had similar outcomes, but the fact that the European Union has had the intent of slowly and steadily 
tried to become a body to increase happiness and security to its peoples, which still spawns populist 
outcry, tells of structural inadequacies of its makeup. 
As the rise of Right-TAL-populism has managed to influence every state in Europe during recent 
times, the reservations of mainstream centrist parties to this new phenomenon has increased. What 
has also increased is the self-feeding of discontent in confrontational nationalist parties. Despite 
The Finns Party(PS) getting a landslide victory in the 2011 parliamentary elections, becoming the 
third largest party, it didn’t rise into a cabinet position(Westinen, 2015 p. 250; Pajala, 2013). The 
reservations on the Finns Party left them with no other options than to mobilize a strong 
Eurosceptic opposition. The Finns Party decided to remain in opposition for the time being and 
their voters tended to agree(Raunio, 2016). Before the 2011 parliamentary election the Finns Party 
had naturally become close to their supporters in anti-immigration online communities and were 
able to recruit members and parliamentary candidates(Hatakka, 2017). Anti-immigration policy had 
been a marginal phenomenon in the sense that it had been discussed in a very consensual manner. 
The Finns Party started to change this by its activists taking on the online community, much the 
same way as other nationalist anti-immigration activists and anti-jihadists across Europe and 
America. 
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7. PROTOCOL OF LEGISLATIVE 
DRAFTING 
7.1. Modeling legislative action 
It is proper to distinguish the way that legislative decision making is conducted in Eduskunta. The 
protocol in question is quite weighty, but it helps to understand what sort of journey an initiative 
goes through until it can ultimately be discussed in plenary session and be written down in the law 
books. However, in the Finnish Eduskunta, a bill doesn’t need a vote for it to become law. The 
plenary session can just decide to be unanimous(Pajala, 2010). All information regarding the 
Eduskunta protocol is mainly referring to the Legislative Drafting Guide of the Collection of 
Finnish Laws, Finlex(lainvalmistelu.finlex.fi). 
When changes to the legislature is being demanded, it can happen from one of six sources: The 
Government, the Parliament Eduskunta, certain ministry, stakeholders or or authorities responsible 
for implementation, the European Union(EU), whether the initiative is being of instrumental or 
legislative nature, or from citizens themselves. The last one mentioned of initiative starting points 
had been put into place in 2012(Finlex, 2012) and gives the citizens a more direct way to contribute 
to legislative affairs in Eduskunta, if one or several citizens of voting age are able to collect 50,000 
supporting statements within six months. The citizen’s initiative does appear in legislative plenary 
votes to a degree in the plenary sessions of 2017 as well, in the case where an already passed 
citizen’s initiative would be revoked(Pohjanpalo, 2017). 
After an initiative has been delivered to the proper authorities, being the appropriate ministry, with 
also the ministry of justice playing a large role, proper measures are done so that the draft can 
become an actual bill. However, for any initiative to be ready for the assessment of a parliamentary 
plenary vote, it must first go through four cycles of preparation, where preparatory bodies examine 
the legal aspects of the initiative, as well as monetary aspects regarding it. Consultation is also 
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asked from stakeholders for the same reason. One of the cycles can last from four to six weeks, as 
possible alternative options are considered and the draft, so it can become a bill, is meticulously 
scrutinized to create a proper legally valid text both in Finnish and Swedish. 
After preparation the bill is delivered to the Government to look at it once more and make necessary 
changes. Several cycles to change the bill can be made and the minister that is responsible for the 
bill in question can revoke it at this point. This means that if the bill concerns e.g. forestry, the 
minister of agriculture and forestry should have an increased interest on the lifecycle of the bill. 
After the bill is given an ”ok” by the government, it is printed and dispatched to the Eduskunta 
plenary session, where it is reviewed once more in committees linked to the proper ministry and 
needed changes are requested with the state officials contributing. Possible amendments are 
proposed and the bill draft is then  sent to  committees so that further drafting is contributed by 
professionals of the given issue and addresses countering the proposal can be drafted. The 
committees can now decide whether to go forward with the bill or not. The countering views for the 
bill are examined by the ministry officials, so that if the bill can be brought to a plenary session 
with the views of all it concerns are taken into account. After all this it is time for Eduskunta to take 
measure on what to do with the bill. Whether or not a vote on the bill is issued, depends on the 
dealings inside the plenary session. The vote regarding a bill is possible to arrange in a manner of 
legislators being for or against it. However, it is quite usual that the propositions by MPs are made 
to compete head-to-head against other proposals depending on what the order of the vote is. 
The decision over the order of the vote, which is in the hands of the chairman 
council(Puhemiesneuvosto). This is an issue that should be highlighted. Ordeshook draws(1986, p. 
56, 65-66) from the Arrow’s Impossibility and Condorcet paradox literature and states that this sort 
of agenda setting eats away from simple majority decisions being the best indicator of proper 
democratic process. The order of issues opposing one another is not trivial, because there is a 
possibility for the outcome to change in an alternative order of vote. For an example we can look at 
the government long term budgetary plan regarding the timeframe 2018-2021. The discussion 
regarding the government measures in utilizing the optimism in the state’s financial prospects,  
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Table 1. Empirical example of pre-determined voting order in action 
turned to a melange of various large political issues that have plagued the relationship between the 
government and opposition for several years. Among other things, the polarizing healthcare reform 
proposals and measures towards curbing unemployment were hotly debated. MPs Viitanen, Uotila, 
Biaudet, Yanar, Östman and Ronkainen issued their PPGs proposals respectably on spending 
measures and they were put into vote. During 28th of June the opposition proposals from MPs had 
been put into voting order which Eduskunta accepted. One by one the proposals issued by several 
opposition MPs(record PTK 77/2017)where voted down, first against one another, and the 
prevailing proposition was put into vote against the government stance(record PTK 78/2017 vp). 
The relative closeness of the various propositions prevailing are illustrated in Table 1, where the 
prevailing votes are shown in bold. Had the chairman committee decided on a different order of 
vote, one might speculate how it could have influenced the outcome. The order originally presented 
for the objections for the budget bill was 1.Viitanen(SDP), 2.Yanar(Vihr.), 3.Uotila(Vas.), 
4.Biaudet(RKP), 5. Östman(KD), 6. Ronkainen(PS), 7. Uotila(Vas.). It can be speculated that if the 
order first presented haven’t been altered, the last objection on line being voted against the 
Government proposal might have been different. Worthy to note is that no matter which Opposition 
PPG objected, the majority of the Government coalition(PPGs KESK and KOK) are firmly voting 
in unison. These groups voted for both the SDP and Vihr.(the main critics of Government 
policy)objection proposals to oust the proposals  of both RKP and KD, which are ideologically 
nearest to Government policy. In a sense, the Government coalition voted to prevent small centre-
right parties to influence the drafting  of Government policy from the Opposition side. The newly 
established PPG Blue Reform(SIN) did not vote according to the Government majority on most of 
the issues, although it would have had a pivotal role, had it sticked to the stance of the Government 
majority. In spite of this, SIN returned to corroborate within its coalition on the last vote enforcing 
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the original Government proposal against the winning Uotila. Had the last objection proposal been 
from the KD or RKP PPGs, the Government PPGs might had to consider amending their own 
budget draft with tax decreases(RKP proposal) or distribution of monetary benefits for businesses 
starting up, both of which are usually favored by at least the KOK representatives.  
7.2. The Role of Committees 
Eduskunta’s records regarding its own rules of engagement are stipulated by the workbook dating 
back from 1908, which is readily available on the Eduskunta website. From its opening the 
election of committees is discussed as they are the driving force in monitoring the drafting of bills 
and proposals. Since the details of any given bill or proposal, being it an issue that will be voted on 
or not, are not possible to be rigorously scrutinized during plenary sessions, the main body of this 
sort of work is done inside the committees. Because of this, the committees are the place where the 
contents of any given draft is meant to be finalized as well as possible. This is why the preferences 
of any given PPG regarding legislature, as well as the deals which PPGs make between each other, 
are prevalent behind the committee sessions commencing behind closed doors. The amount of 
committees in the committee workbook from 2015 states that the amount of permanent 
committees, which are the Great Committee of issues regarded as general, as well as the special 
committees, which together amount to 15. The Great committee has 25 members and 13 reserve 
members. Other permanent committees have 17 members and 9 reserve members respectfully. 
There is also the possibility of the establishment of temporary committees if needed. The voting 
inside the committees proceeds in the manner of the vote for the chairman of Eduskunta, by closed 
ballots. In these sort of circumstances the leaders of PPGs can be tempted to steer the PPG line 
towards the platform of the party proper. 
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8. NATURAL DATA 
8.1. Origins 
The plenary voting data about the parliamentary year 2017 of the Finnish Parliament Eduskunta is 
the courtesy of Antti Pajala, who’s studies on voting cohesion in the University of Turku are well 
established, as is his contributions to related literature. See Pajala(2010; 2013; 2014) and Solvak & 
Pajala(2016). 
The original interest in looking at the natural voting data of this particular parliamentary year, was 
because, in addition to several well publicized and polarizing incidents during this particular year, 
of the sudden split of the Finns Party. If one is interested in how PPGs cast their vote in plenary 
sessions, the question arises of how one party suddenly becoming two, influences the voting 
cohesion of the legislators in question(i.e. The Finns vs The Blue Reform). 
The amount of issues which were decided by vote in the plenary sessions of Eduskunta amounted to 
1013 in the year 2017. Echoing the work of Pajala(2010), the overall cohesion of all PPGs seem to 
be high. At least when looking at single PPGs in the case of the parliamentary year 2017, the 
supposition for formidable cohesion in the Nordics(Laver & Schofield, 1998), seems to be true in 
this case. 
The first valuable information that can be extracted by the natural voting data is the fact that the 
plenary votes in Eduskunta are not distributed evenly across the year. This fact has also been 
established in a previous study on Finnish Parliament plenary voting by Pajala(2010). During the 
first quarter of the parliamentary year, Eduskunta voted on only 1.28% (13) of the issues of that 
particular year. During the second quarter, there were votes on 9.18%(93) of all the issues. There 
were no plenary votes cast on the third quarter. The majority of all the plenary voting issues, 
89.54%(907), where processed during the end of the year. A majority of them during December. 
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Because of the skewness of the plenary votes happening so far at the end of the year, it is infeasible 
to compare the Finns Party(PS) PPG voting activity during the time it hadn’t been splintered into 
two separate PPGs and the time when the splintering had happened. There is still possible to look at 
how the two political entities behave in plenary votes after the split, in the context of previous 
information acquired about Government PPG voting activity and Opposition voting activity. 
When looking at µ (mean)cohesion values, the overall cohesion of the Eduskunta as a whole is Rice 
µ =0,4074, and Hix µ =0,5531 respectably. It would seem that MPs do not use their option of 
´Abstain ´ very much throughout Eduskunta. This entails the Hix value being larger than the Rice 
value. Cohesion Indeces of separate PPGs do indicate that some of the legislators vote Abstain 
sometimes, but this seems to be a random event. Better than supposing this, we can try and 
distinguish the importance of the Abstain possibility to legislators with very simplistic algebra.  
There are large parties (>35MPs) and not so large parties (= or <35MPs) in Eduskunta. 
By eyeing the results of the Rice Index values and Hix Index values, one can see the push of the 
nominal cohesion µ up on the Hix Index in the way that can be most visible with large parties. 
In smaller parties, the shift from nominal Rice µ=0,4074 to Hix µ=0,5531 isn’t as prevalent than 
with large parties. This means that the small parties’ cohesion isn’t affected by the amount of 
cohesion change the shift from Rice µ to Hix µ offers. When we take µ of all the large parties’ shift 
from Rice —> Hix(=Hix µ - Rice µ) and compare it to the small parties’ shift from Rice —> Hix, 
the proportionate change is three times more prevalent in small parties than large ones. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The KD cohesion drops dramatically when losing even one vote, but will 
never plummet as low as the PS cohesion could, because of the differences in PPG size. For the 
same reason KD cannot have its cohesion drop to 0, because of its odd number of MPs. 
Since the shift is least visible, yet same time more prevalent in small parties, we have to conclude 
that abstaining it is not a phenomenon that is common and that we can make robust determinations 
about the voting cohesion of 2017 without taking into account the Abstain votes initially. —> We 
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will thus use only Rice Index values. Empirically, we can count the issues where government 
coalition MPs voted to abstain, and find out that respectably the Abstain vote was used three 
times(0.2% of all issues voted and 1/4 of all ´loss of total cohesion-votes´) with KESK, one 
time(0.09% of all issues voted and 1/13 of all ´loss of total cohesion-votes´) with KOK, and twelve 
times(1.2% of all issues voted and 3/8 of all ´loss of total cohesion-votes´) with SIN. The popularity 
of use of the Abstain vote was large enough to look at abstaining as a separate measure all by itself. 
The Rice Index value indicates that throughout 2017 the votes for the government position is at 
least twice as prevalent as the votes opposing it. The abbreviation of the issues discussed are shown 
in the Table 2 and are translated into English therein. During the year in question, the number of 
issues where ´Yes´ votes prevailed, amounted to 1007(99,4%). Government coalition won them. 
There were also five(0,49%) issues where the majority voted ´No´. On one of these cases, 
Opposition coalition won. In one case the vote between ´Yes´ and ´No´ was tied(0,0987%). This 
single case prompted the Finnish national news network YLE to write about it(Auvinen, 2017), 
which in a sense is a telltale sign of the expectations of the legislative power between government 
and opposition coalitions. The issue itself was for reserving funds from the complementary state 
budget estimate to tend for the needs of war veterans. The tied vote lead to a rare closed ballot vote, 
which the opposition ultimately won. 
The examination of expected cohesion Index values reveals, that the smaller PPGs are in a 
favorable position in comparison to larger ones. It is true that by losing one vote, larger PPGs 
cohesion diminishes less than the cohesion of the smaller party. However, the larger parties have 
more MPs to keep in check in regards to voting in unison. The smaller parties can be expected to 
keep up higher cohesion rates with less numerical representation because of the group size, or lack 
of it. 
The issues that experienced no dwindling in cohesion amounted to 407, totaling approx. 40% of all 
issues that were voted on. This means that approx. 60% of all issues that were voted on had some 
amount of lack of cohesion inside some of the PPGs. Because the overall cohesion of all of the 
PPGs was high, it is safe to assume that PPGs didn’t disagree on certain specific degrees across 
Eduskunta, but were divided in certain issues regarding a certain Parliamentary Party Group. The 
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extensive lack of unity on issues doesn’t happen simultaneously across several parties of the same 
coalition. Also, we should look at how extensive the break in cohesion was on certain PPGs, as 
single MPs voting against their group preference(Total cohesion - one vote) can be considered 
outliers, as their single personalized behavior doesn’t make a difference in the majority’s stance. 
The issues that made the respected PPGs to lose their total cohesion throughout 2017 can be looked 
at a coalition level, when we can see that certain issues that were voted upon made the legislators 
divided as a group. We can see that votes concerning the the state budget, as proposed by the 
government coalition, are the ones that mostly made the opposition coalition to lose their cohesion 
as a group. 
If we select the issues where cohesion was lost, but do not take into account the cases where total 
cohesion suffers by one vote, there’s possibility to get an idea about what sort of policy suggestions 
divided the MPs, how much so, and to perhaps indicate what direction did they move in terms of 
policy space. 
8.2. ´Absent´ votes 
The absent votes, which the Rice index doesn’t take into account, do occur with all of the PPGs. It 
is however important to note, that in regards to the whole PPG, single absent votes do not make a 
whole lot of difference on the outcome. However, by studying how often the abstain vote was 
used, we can be able to see if it has strategic importance. 
When we look at how many times the absent-vote appeared overall, we may perhaps assess 1) 
what where are bills where the absent vote is used, 2) whether there is more than one absent vote 
from a PPG during a plenary vote, 3) whether the amount of the strategic absent votes reveal 
patterns in reference to PPG size. 
The government coalition used the option for abstain in a handful of issues. With KOK, having just 
a single absent vote during the whole year(issue VNS 4 mentioned in chapter 7.1. where Vihr. and 
RKP proposals were head-to-head), and SIN, of whose MPs pressed the abstain button twelve 
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times during the year. These were rogue votes regarding Government budget and interpellation, 
and where cast by two MPs, party secretary Torvinen(mainly) and Turunen. The absent votes of 
KESK where different. They where given in three case, only one of which was a single absent 
vote. The issues regarded the retracting of the law for gender neutral marriage and a single budget 
issue regarding the work of the Ministry of Transport & Communication. 
In comparison to PPG size of the opposition coalition, the PS had the most notable relative use of 
the absent vote during the course of the year. When we compare the amount of single absent votes 
to multiple absent votes regarding a single issue, we see that PS was the one that preferred to use 
the absent vote as a group. For comparison, the Swedish People’s Party’s legislators used the 
abstain vote in almost 6% of all the issues during 2017. This is by far the largest amount of issues 
where any given PPG uses the possibility to abstain. However, in only eight of these there were 
more than one MP involved. Therefore the relative amount of absent votes, taken into account 
single votes and PPG size, is much larger in the case of PS, with its six multiple absent votes in 
comparison to the cases where a single MP decided to abstain. From the Opposition PPGs, PS used 
the vote to abstain on a variety of issues. These were the citizen’s initiatives; the gender neutral 
marriage issue(KAA 2/2016), as well as the reform of alcohol policy. In addition to this, budget 
reform involving taxes and transport where also prone to cause abstentions with PS. With the RKP, 
the abstentions mainly involved the same transport and communications ministry issues which 
tended to have a polarizing effect throughout the Opposition. In addition to this, labor issues and 
taxes also caused single RKP MPs to abstain. Single SDP MPs abstained mostly on issues 
regarding Transport and Communication Ministry issues. There was also a single Government 
report regarding income tax which made the SDP MPs abstain as a group. Vas. MPs abstained 
mainly on social and environmental issues. PPG Vihr. abstained because of risk management on 
behalf of the state(O 72/2016), as well as agriculture, transport, social and taxation issues. KD 
MPs abstained on issues regarding unemployment. 
8.3. Indicators 
The movement that the Opposition takes in policy space can be looked through how large the 
cohesion of a given Opposition group is in a specified situation. This information is compared to 
both the Government coalition and the Opposition coalition as a whole. To retrieve a proper 
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understanding of the plenary votes, we can look at the freedom of movement. That is how much 
the unity of a  single PPG suffers in comparison to all the other PPGs. In addition to the freedom 
of movement, the amount of cohesion(or the lack of) is looked at as an indicator in the 
circumstances which the the various issues being voted upon, present. 
The median cohesion of the Opposition cohesion presents a marker for which the cohesion of the 
single opposition PPGs can be compared with. The extreme cases where cohesion is lost are the 
ones that are closest to the RICE Index 0, yet not being so. This group of cohesion scores below 
Opposition cohesion median. If we take as an ´example PPG´, which performs a subset of issues 
with the cohesion below Opposition median. Then we will be able to determine how much the 
Opposition is able to travel towards the Government stance in this particular context. This means 
that from all of the 1013 issues being voted upon, the issue groups being determined to be part of a 
group set by the indicators, are pulled out in order to establish an idea of the movement Opposition 
needs to take in order to achieve at least some of its policy goals. 
Opposition Cohesion Indicator = OCI 
OCI 1: The amount of issues where the PPGs indicate single MPs deviating from the majority 
position could be considered as an indicator for individual freedom of movement when looked at 
several issues simultaneously. These deviating votes can also be seen as outliers in regards to 
single issues. 
OCI 2: The issues where voted with a cohesion value above median. The cohesion doesn’t suffer 
substantially. 
OCI 3: The positions taken on issues one way or the other draw near to one another, and cohesion 
suffers substantially. 
All of the movement indicators should be compared to the total cohesion of PPGs. This reveals the 
distance the Opposition PPG travelled towards the Government coalition Mean standpoint, as the 
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total cohesion of an Opposition PPG can side with the Government coalition in some instances. 
Examples of this: 
-Issue HE 161/2016, 7th of April 2017, Opposition PPG(RKP) voted with total cohesion 
supporting the Government proposal of the 2. part of law draft involving transport and 
communication services accessibility. 
-Issue VK 4/2017 vp, 8th December 2017, Opposition PPG(KD) voted with Government stance 
against interpellation on growing inequality. 
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9. HYPOTHESES 
9.1. The Finns Party as a phenomenon 
The Finns Party have generated a significant amount of studies regarding their emergence to the 
Finnish political scene as populist, far-right, nationalist, opportunistic or other similar denominators 
which the rest of the Finnish political parties do not adhere to. In a sense, the Finns Party have been 
the odd one out because they have established their voter base on large and polarizing issues such as 
immigration and reservations towards the EU. Furthermore, their dissimilation towards the socio-
economic left to right axis makes their movement in a Likert scale difficult to determine 
beforehand. This means that The Finns Party’s luring of voters with populist issues had been 
targeted towards both the working population, as well as eligible voters outside this realm. The’ve 
therefore tried to capture votes from a larger horizontal area of the Likert scale than the other 
parties, which are still quite rigid in their movement outside the traditional class cleavages.  The 
characterization of the Finns Party has been looked through the literature regarding the emergence 
of post-materialistic tendencies in the policies of European democracies. Because of this, there is no 
perfect characterization that makes The Finns Party totally different from all the other Finnish 
parliamentary parties, but the aspects that make The Finns Party what it is, can perhaps be 
characterized, to a degree, based on their movement in policy space. 
The movement in political space is best assessed by natural data of plenary votes, as other second 
hand information, such as interviews, are more prone to biases. Intra-party cohesion is something 
that can help to estimate the power a PPG has to affect legislation, whether they side with the 
government coalition or not. Because The Finns Party displays characteristics differentiate from the 
other parties, we can assume that their voting cohesion in comparison to other parliamentary party 
groups voting cohesion can vary as well, given that the given characteristics are well grounded. 
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9.2. Comparison of platforms 
When looking at the party platforms of Finnish political parties, how parties define themselves, 
some aspects are visible from the first lines of these manifesto’s. All of the Finnish parliamentary 
party platforms are available online and are, excluding the platform of the Social Democratic 
Party, fully accepted by the parties’ central authorities. The difference of the Social Democrats is 
that their ´draft´ platform, written in 2018 as an extension of the principles from the 2017 party 
convention, gives the party members as well as others to comment and discuss the platforms 
various items. 
Some of the parties´ agendas represent political ideals that stem from historically transnational 
movements such as labor movements and environmental awakening. These ideals are prominent in 
the platforms of the Social Democrats, Left Alliance and the Greens. Similar connotations have 
also emerged in the platform of the National Coalition party which positions itself as ´blue-green´ 
bourgeoisie movement, but is more subtle in its viewpoints than with their traditional left wing 
counterparts. What this means is that KOK implies that being environmentally well-informed is   a 
form of sophistication, whereas the Greens(Vihr.) regard the environment as something that 
humans need to adapt to.  Minority issues are also prominent in the platform of the Swedish People
´s party platform that emphasizes Finland being a country with two distinguishable identities and 
cultures living side by side, the Finnish speakers and the Swedish speakers. This overarching 
agenda is seasoned with calls for universal acceptance for tolerance and belief in a brighter future. 
The Centre Party has similar aspects in its vast 101-point program of inclusiveness of all Finnish 
people and the rejection of positioning itself in either the left or right wings of  the political 
spectrum. 
The subtlety of the effusive wording seen in the platforms of both the National Coalition´s, 
Swedish Peoples Party´s and Centre Party´s platforms, is also manifest in the platform of the Blue 
Reform, which however stresses the Finnish people itself as an independent actor in a sea of nation 
states. 
The platform of the Finns Party emphasizes its differentiation from all other parties, being straight 
forwards and ´telling the truth no matter what´. It also emphasizes its detachment from traditional 
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cleavages resulting from close assimilation to non-parliamentary organizations which has 
influenced the policies of the traditionally powerful and large parties such as the Social Democrats 
and National Coalition. The differentiation from mainstream parties has been the lifeblood of the 
Finns Party from its inception and has formulated its policy in a similar manner that the party´s 
predecessor Finnish Rural Party(SMP) differentiated as the opponent of political elites with the 
powerful rhetoric of their long standing chairman Veikko Vennamo. His political disciple Timo 
Soini looked for powerful speakers to interpret the sentiment of native Finns that felt let down by 
their position in a globalizing society. Soini has used aspects of his mentor’s rhetoric to approach 
the ´common Finn´, to speak their language and even go over the top with it. Soini coined words 
not formerly used in Finnish politics, like ´Jytky´, a colloquial describing the PS crashing into the 
political mainstream, as well as using Fennificated terms such as ´ploki´ to mean his personal 
weblog. (National Coalition Party platform, 2019; Centre Party platform, 2019; Blue Reform 
Party platform, 2019; True Finns Party platform, 2019; Swedish People´s Party platform, 2019; 
Social Democratic Party platform, 2019; Left Alliance party platform, 2019; Greens Party 
platform, 2019; Christian Democrats Party platform, 2019) 
9.3. The null Hypothesis(H0) 
H0= A party which is irregular in terms of platform, could be considered populist, having catch-all 
tendencies or being other ways irregular in comparison to platforms of other parties, can be 
expected to move in similar fashion as any other party in policy space. 
9.4. The Hypothesis 1(H1) 
H1= A party which contests over voters that prefer policy outside the mainstream, having populist 
tendencies by challenging alleged political elites, displays differing movement in policy space as 
the parties which it challenges. 
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10. MODEL 
Figure 4. Party positioning on the 
soc ioeconomic(Lef t -Right ) and 
postmaterial(TAN-GAL) axises in the 
beginning of 2017 according to 
Koivula et al. (2019) 
The final votes for amendments in bill drafts are issued so that the final position by the Government 
is usually ´Yes´. This can be seen from the votes where the most preferred amendment text is first 
voted on sequentially, after which the preferred amendment proposal is voted against the 
Government proposal ´Yes´, Opposition proposal ´No´. 
In general, all of the MPs from respected PPGs want their preferred outcome to be fulfilled in the 
plenary votes. Each one of the MPs have their ideal points in policy space, which are situated in or 
to a close proximity of the policy points illustrated by Figure 4. For every MP, the preferred 
outcome is a vote where the distance from the preferred policy, as demonstrated by the party’s 
platforms, is as short as possible. This means that with every MP inside a PPG, there is a minimum 
amount of compromising of the preferred position on a given issue. 
The Government coalition is usually responsible for the original drafts of bills, which the 
Opposition might, or might not try to amend. Therefore the Government coalition is not usually 
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expected to move away from its preferred policy space. There is exceptions to this. For example, 
the citizen’s initiative to repeal another citizen’s initiative for gender neutral marriage(KAA 2/2016) 
was lobbied by then Government PPG member Mika Niikko(PS). This rare occasion broke the 
cohesion of the Government front by one of their own. In hindsight, Niikko(Tamminen, 2015) was 
one of the MPs that moved to the Opposition after the reshuffle of the parliamentary base. The 
Government coalition partners need to draft their bills so that their MPs won’t fall in a situation 
where voting for the Government draft conflicts the will of the MPs constituencies. Sometimes this 
sort of conflict does occur, and the Government is not able to vote with total unity. 
Because the Opposition is usually in a reactionary position, it is expected to move in policy space 
by not only the constraints that their MPs have set, but also the position that the Government sets 
with its drafts. Therefore the Opposition is exposed to more constraints in its movement towards its 
own preferred policy space than the Government coalition. 
In essence, both the Government and Opposition coalitions are trying to maximize their utility. The 
expected utility in a situation where the Opposition is exposed to more constraints than the 
Government coalition, results in the expected utility from movement of the Government being 
larger than of the Opposition coalition. 
The movement in the Likert scale(Figure 4) should be more prominent with all the Opposition 
parties. These parties have heterogenous platforms, particularly PS against all the other Opposition 
PPGs. As the respected Opposition PPGs vote while losing cohesion(the MPs are divided over ´Yes
´ and ´No´), the respected preferences for particular issues are could be revealed. 
By determining what the policy position is likely to be by voting ´Yes´, we will have the supposed 
direction the Government coalition takes almost every time they vote. 
As illustrated by Pajala(2013), the movement of the Government coalition can be quite rigid, as its 
members do not tend to deviate, given the power of being in the position of the prime policy maker. 
Therefore the Opposition movement against the Government standpoint is revealing on where the 
costs and payoffs lie. 
If we consider the respected coalitions voting preferences being the movement in sprints from one 
position to another, we can develop some kind of an idea of what kind of distance the Opposition 
coalition could go in order to it’s members to 1) keep their promises to their own constituencies, 2) 
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keep their relationship towards other members intact, 3) safeguard the unity of the group so that it 
doesn’t lose its majority voting constituency, and possibly be eligible for re-election. 
If assumed that the PPG leader acts as a focal arbiter, the unified will of a PPG can be directed to 
achieve a common goal more likely than just the group members acting out their personal 
preferences in a plenary voting session. Considering a situation where a varied amount voters elect 
either one of two worthy possibilities, Myerson & Weber(1993) consider the focal arbiters to be 
major opinion leaders, possibly aided by mass media. If we consider the closed setting of an 
Eduskunta plenary vote to have similar focal arbiters, they would most likely be acting to achieve a 
common, unified preference inside, but not limited to, committees. If the Government coalition 
enjoys a majority position, the movement of a Government coalition PPG positions itself in a 
relatively staunch preference point, where from little or no deviating movement is thought to be 
probable. 
If we would consider the Government and Opposition PPGs to be positioned in a manner of a game, 
where movement across the one dimensional policy space occurs sequentially, the Government PPG 
has advantage of moving first. Hence the Opposition is constantly moving to correct its own 
movement and weigh its movement options against its own utility. Therefore, it is safe to assume 
that the amount of movement in policy space (to correct its position)is greater on the Opposition 
side, its means to draft legislation being restricted in comparison to the Government coalition. The 
differentiation of single Opposition PPGs can be determined by what is the distance they are 
respectfully willing to travel in policy space to satisfy the policy positions. These position are, 
similarly to the Government’s, the constraints their constituencies, peers and party proper have set. 
By extracting a sample of issues large enough to represent the voting activity of the year in 
question, there is also the possibility to compare the similarities of the Opposition PPGs and 
determine whether there are outsiders within the Opposition bloc. 
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11. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
11.1. Issue Classification Abbreviations 
The issues being voted upon in plenary sessions of 2017 in the Finnish Eduskunta amounted to 
1013, and the government coalition sat on the drivers seat of policy making. Therefore the 
government coalition acted as the prime mover in almost all cases where the decision to cast a vote 
was made. 
Table 2. All plenary vote categories, abbreviations and abbreviation meanings. 
In the same way as Pajala(2013) draws attention to the voting activity of the Opposition, the plenary 
voting of 2017 can be looked at in similar fashion. The mean stance taken by the Government on 
votes is primarily that of  voting ´Yes´ to the bills it itself drafts. Therefore the movement towards 
the Government standpoint by the Opposition is primarily(but not absolutely) the relative amount of 
voting ´Yes´. The mean cohesion of the Government coalition during 2017 was (RI)0.99497. The 
most prominent issue classification was ´HE´, which is the Government’s motion/proposal, usually 
regarding the state budget or amendment to legislation. These issues comprise of 77.5% of all issues 
voted for during 2017. 
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11.2. Opposition Having Total Cohesion 
The issues driving the Opposition for achieving total cohesion, ´Rice Index 1´, are plentiful yet 
varied. A single Opposition PPG can have total cohesion voting ´Yes´ on one issue and total 
cohesion voting ´No´ on another. Drawing an example from Figure 5, The Finns(PS) MPs voted 
´Yes´ with total cohesion on 256 issues(blue column), whereas the issues where the fully cohesive 
support was for ´No´, 461 issues(green column). This is the starting point for the Opposition 
coalition in regards to what their totally cohesive preferences are. 
Figure 5. Relative amounts of issues Opposition voted with total cohesion during year 2017. ´Yes´-
votes are the blue columns, ´No´-votes are the green columns. 
11.3. OCI1 
The relative amount of freedom of Opposition PPGs is counting the amount of issues where 
cohesion was lost by a single MP voting against the group majority. At minimum these cases where 
at least five times more prevalent in the Opposition coalition than the Government coalition. Since 
the assumption for this sort of minimal deviation can manifest from any one of the PPG members, 
the dividing of the amount of issues with the amount of respected PPG members, can give us a 
nominal figure of representative’s voting volatility in his/her own group on average(Table 3). 
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 Table 3. Average single representative volatility. 
The amount of volatility is predominant in smaller PPGs, whereas the largest opposition PPG(SDP) 
is least volatile to single MPs voting against the majority line. The smallest party in Eduskunta, KD, 
has the single member volatility more than ten times that of SDP. 
11.4. OCI2 
When drawing comparison between the PPGs which had cohesion above the Opposition coalition 
median, we must all address to what direction the cohesion moves proportionately. In an illustration 
of these cohesion values, we see the preferred direction the Opposition PPGs start to take. In Figure 
6 the proportions of Yes and No majorities issues is illustrated by a bar table. As cohesion 
decreases, part of the Opposition PPGs (PS, SDP, Vas) start to show immediate attraction towards 
the average Government stance, whereas other PPGs tilt toward the similar direction only slightly. 
In comparison to single vote deviation(OCI1), the preference of the smallest party KD doesn’t 
drastically tilt towards Government or Opposition. A similar phenomenon can be seen with Vihr. 
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 Figure 6. Opposition coalition majority votes for either ´Yes´(blue column) or ´No´(green column) 
in situation where cohesion has dropped but is still above Opposition median. 
11.5. OCI3 
Voting cohesion drops below Opposition coalition median. The movement towards the 
Government coalition standpoint seems to be enhancing with the issues that influence the cohesion 
negatively(Figure 7.). The results for the KD PPG cannot be seen, as its cohesion cannot drop 
below the median cohesion of the Opposition coalition, as illustrated in chapter 3. 
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Figure 7. Opposition coalition majority votes for either ´Yes´(blue column) or ´No´(green column) 
in situation where cohesion has dropped below Opposition median. KD is not included as its PPG 
is too small to present such low cohesion figures. 
11.6. Random Sample 
By extracting a random sample from all of the issues being voted for can help to determine the 
relationships between the Opposition PPGs in regards to how they vote. The random sample is 
comprised of 65 issues which should represent, to some extent, the overall composition of the 
plenary vote issues of 2017. The sample is comprised of  2 interpellations(VK), which are the 
Opposition’s offensive towards the Government by issuing a vote of confidence. All of the other 
issues of the sample are Government motions(HE). Firstly, to see what sort of ´role in coalition´ a 
single Opposition PPG has on votes, we compare the respected PPG votes majorities(how did the 
majority vote on an issue), to the Opposition majority vote overall. This can be illustrated with 
Table 4. The issue HE 161/2016(First proposal, Part IV, Chapter 2, 2§, report) which was one of a 
series of bills proposing the development of a national MaaS(Mobility as a Service) 
framework(Liikennekaari), and of which MP Katja Taimela aimed to seek an amendment via vote 
according to an objection concerning the acquirement of information by authorities. The proposal 
bearing Taimela’s name was voted down. 
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 Table 4. HE 161/2016(First proposal, Part IV, Chapter 2, 2§, report). The majority responses of the 
Opposition coalition. PS and Vihr. majorities voting against Opposition majority. 
On all of the 65 issues that comprise the sample, we can see that the Opposition majority is driven 
by the largest opposition party, drawing its likeminded comrades in its wake. By ordering the 
parties on who’s majority standpoint fits best to the Opposition coalition majority, we see (Table 5.) 
that the left wing parties are closest to the overall Opposition majority. In addition to this, when 
looking at how all Opposition parties vote relative to one another, we also see that the ´most 
prominent likeness to one another´ can be found from within the traditional left wing parties(SDP, 
Vas.). 
Table 5. The largest Opposition PPG (upper right)drives the Opposition majority with smaller left 
wing counterpart voting similarly. 
The likeness of voting behavior across the Opposition PPGs is illustrated in Table 6, where the of 
the left wing Opposition PPGs are situated on the top of the likeness scale. This could imply that the 
voting behavior the largest Opposition PPG is reinforced with smaller like minded parties acting as 
additional enforcement. 
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Table 6. The left wing parties(upper right corner of the reordering) seem to have more in common 
with one another than the remainder of the Opposition coalition. Comparison to Figure 12. 
suggests that a part of the Opposition coalition votes as a bloc, a part does not. The remainder 
PPGs(PS, RKP, KD)do not present similarity towards each other the way that the left wing parties 
do. 
11.7. Most polarizing issues 
Generally speaking, the issues for which the cohesion of the Opposition parties took the most hit, 
where concerning certain large bodies of issues. An exception of this was one very formidable 
occurrence which decimated the cohesion of PS but for which the the other Opposition PPGs voted 
with unison. This is the case of the Government informing of the changes in the parliamentary 
base, which meant the split of the Finns Party. The largest ´unity decreaser´ body was the issues 
concerning the Ministry of Transport and Communication. In a sense, this can be due to the fact 
that the purpose of the combined law package for transport and communication aimed to assemble 
relevant laws in one place so that future innovation involving transport and communication 
services wouldn’t be curbed by excess bureaucracy(Faktalehti 48/2017). These large legislative 
changes are usually expected to last a long time, possibly years, and comprise the bulk of the 
Government work during its tenure. During such a timeframe the increased information on the 
issue at hand might tend to shift perceptions on what should be done. However, these issues 
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affected the smaller Opposition PPGs more than the large SDP, which although its cohesion 
suffered, was able to hold its own through relative unity. This meant that SDP cohesion on the 
issues on the aforementioned ministry ranged from RI 0.5 to RI 0.8. In comparison, with the issues 
regarding the same ministry, PS cohesion suffered with values RI <0.1 to RI 0.4. RKP values 
ranged from RI 0.1 to 0.3. The cohesion decrease of both Vas. and Vihr. were similar (mean RI 0.2) 
but with less variance. Other prominent cohesion decreaser bodies involved the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry-issues as well as the changes(liberalization) in alcohol legislation. 
11.8. Simple Linear Regression 
For issues where the Opposition PPGs lack cohesion, voting ´Yes´ seems to increase in prominence. 
To see if this is valuable information, a simple linear regression can be used to reveal if Opposition 
parties voting with the Government(which overwhelmingly votes ´Yes´). 
The independent variables of choice are the respected Opposition PPGs proportion voting ´YES´. 
X=SDP(%YES*), Vas(%YES*), Vihr(%YES*), PS(%YES*), KD(%YES*), RKP(%YES*) 
Y=Opposition(%YES*) 
*(Proportion of available votes) 
The dependent variable is the Opposition proportion voting ´YES´. These variables do not use the 
Rice Index, but the proportionality takes into account all of the votes at hand in a given issue voted. 
This includes the ´Abstain´ votes. The random sample is 65 issues voted from across the timespan 
of 2017. Using an online tool(GraphPad), the results are illustrated in the corresponding Table 7. 
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 Table 7. The samples of the Opposition PPG 
votes have a p-value <5. The sample size is of 
good representation. 
SDP voting ´Yes´ explains the whole Opposition voting similarly in 70% of the cases, R^2 being 
0.7078. More than half of the votes by Vas. can be explained similarly. The drop in the proportion 
of variance in the case of  Vihr. votes indicate the sporadic way the Greens voted in comparison to 
the whole Opposition’s attraction in voting with the Government. The variance of PS 
representatives voting with the Government is only a quarter of the votes. By comparing the 
regression charts of SDP, PS and Vihr., the way that the ´Yes´ votes are distributed act as an aid to 
understanding whether the respected PPGs votes indicate similarity in the movement in policy 
space. 
Figure 8. SDP votes for YES(X), 
Opposition as a whole votes YES(Y). The 
issues which drove the SDP YES votes has 
an impact on the Opposition as a whole. 
The YES votes are clustered in the upper 
right corner. 
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Figure 9. PS votes for YES(X), Opposition 
as a whole votes YES(Y). The YES votes on 
the right are distributed along the vertical 
line, differentiating from SDP of Figure 9. 
 
Figure 10. Vihr. votes for YES(X), 
Opposition as a whole votes YES(Y). The 
Vihr. votes had the closest R^2 value to PS 
when the variance to Opposition is been 
compared. The vote distribution of Vihr. 
differs substantially from PS of Figure 10. 
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12. CONCLUSION 
The largest parties that had been dominating the Eduskunta since 2011 are positioned on  different 
areas of the socioeconomic Left-Right and GAL-TAN axises. The National Coalition(KOK) and 
Centre(KESK) parties are situated on the right, and the Social Democrat(SDP), Greens(Vihr.), Left 
Alliance(Vas.) and Finns Party(PS) are situated on the left, with the Vihr. and PS situated 
themselves curiously on opposing positions on the GAL-TAN axis. From these assumed positions, 
movement occurs in a parliamentary context with every occurring plenary vote. The movement of 
the Government coalition, encompassing of the KESK, KOK, PS, as well as PSs successor party 
SIN, is rather rigid as the Government coalition is the prime drafter of laws and proposals that 
either go to a plenary vote or not. In addition to this, the Government coalition is strong in numbers, 
having the majority representation throughout 2017. All of the other parties correct their positioning 
depending on what the bill might entail and therefore are expected to either stand their ground or 
take leaps towards the Government proposals. 
As the plenary votes go ahead, the issues that do not have the power to break Opposition cohesion 
tend to be votes primarily against Government proposals. At least with one group, encompassing of 
SDP and Vas., takes this position. The other parties of the Opposition, PS(which was an Opposition 
party throughout the majority of the plenary votes of 2017), RKP and KD, didn’t overwhelmingly 
vote against Government proposals with full unity. In fact, RKP, which had participated in several 
Government coalitions with KOK, tend to side more to the Government side with its total cohesion 
votes. 
With the issues where Opposition cohesion was lost, the main Opposition parties SDP, Vas. and 
Vihr. take their leap towards the Government stance. This is illustrated in the comparison of Figure 
5 and Figure 6, showing that the preference for the majority of the MPs flip and the predominant 
columns(blue/green) change places. This effect is present also as the cohesion of the Opposition 
PPGs drop to their lowest points. 
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When looking at the positions of the Opposition PPGs in their starting position, nominally the 
position they have as their cohesion is total, it can be determined which sort of distance the majority 
of these PPGs are willing to travel (proportion of voting ´Yes´ with the Government) as their 
cohesion suffers. Taking into account the Rice Index value of the full unity votes and comparing 
them to the plenary votes where cohesion suffered the most, the distance Opposition PPGs travel in 
policy space can be plotted to a graph which illustrates  comparisons between the respected 
Opposition PPGs. 
Figure 11. The Opposition PPG movement from Opposition towards Government as cohesion 
decreases. The left wing parties Vas. and SDP seem to move furthest towards Government despite 
their relative size difference to one another. The distance PS takes can be deceiving, as its 
preferences differ and its movements takes a deviating route to the larger Opposition coalition 
members. 
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The parties that are positioned furthest from the Government(SDP, Vas., Vihr.)take larger leaps 
towards the Government propositions. As their preferences on issues are similar to one another, it 
can be assumed that they are moving as a bloc. What could see as enhancing this assumption is the 
fact that Vas. and Vihr. are smaller PPGs by members of MPs. Despite this Vas. seems to move even 
further than any other Opposition PPG, possibly trusting on the sympathies of others in this bloc. 
PS also travels a long distance towards Government in a similar situation, but as its preferences on 
issues differs substantially from both the left wing parties, as well as from the remaining parties, its 
motion toward this direction differs. In regards to the null hypothesis(H0) The linear regression 
analysis gives further information on the preferred movement of PPGs, so that respected and 
particular preferences of Opposition PPG movement is highlighted, mirroring the respected party 
platforms. The regression analysis doesn’t support (H0), as the graphic depictions of PS and Vihr. 
votes(Figures 9. & 10) illustrate these parties having somewhat small role in explaining the 
Opposition preferences overall, and also move differently in comparison to one another. The effect 
is similar, but the path leading to results differ. For this same reason, Hypothesis 1(H1) seems to 
capture the essence of PPG movement in this case study. 
Furthermore, the fact that the party SIN, which encompassed of roughly half of the PS at the 
beginning of the parliamentary year, satisfied its role as a Government coalition partner right until 
the year was out. PS on the other hand is the odd one out even in a very heterogenous Opposition. 
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13. DISCUSSION 
Looking at the movement of PPGs in policy space justifies the use of the Rice index, as a PPG 
moving one way or the other is enough to determine policy preference in most issues voted. Also, 
the cohesion calculated by using this particular index has its grounding in previous cohesion studies 
involving the Finnish Eduskunta. The possibility to use one’s vote to abstain has some popularity 
and therefore the Abstain-votes couldn’t be left out of this study, nor should they be ignored in 
future studies. If however the preferences in political entities would be looked at whether they vote 
´Yes´ or ´No´, a linear regression is perhaps not the best way in trying to understand these sort of 
movements. A logit model would satisfy this need better. 
The Government coalition being the main force in drafting legislature can be solid even in 
situations where the composition of parliament suddenly starts to favor the Opposition. In fact, 
these sort of situations should bring about caution in the Opposition camp as long as the 
Government doesn’t lose its majority position. Laver & Schofield(1998) have specifically 
underlined this, as it is possible that governments of minimal winning coalition can be very fit to 
govern, at least until the next election, and that a surplus majority government is not a recipe for 
success indefinitely. 
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